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Successful industrialisation strategies have helped many developing countries transform the structure of 
their economies, enhance productivity and boost economic growth. Prioritising which industrial sectors 
to develop, and how, is paramount given scarce financial resources, skills shortages and limited 
technological capabilities. Although still a developing country, Kenya has the most advanced economy 
among her regional peers. Kenya’s small automotive sector was established four decades ago with the 
support of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies. However, following liberalisation of the 
economy in the last decade of the 20th century, domestic industries were suddenly exposed to competition 
from imported products. On one hand this blunted prospects for faster development of manufacturing 
capabilities, but on the other, imports provided consumers with affordable alternatives. As a result, the 
domestic automobile assembly sector faces ongoing competition from used passenger vehicle imports. 
Fundamentally, the sector lacks access to a sizeable market, which inhibits attraction of large-scale 
investments necessary for upgrading. Market attributes aside, this study found several other challenges 
confronting the sector. These are; the absence of a national automotive strategy, incoherent policy 
decisions and ineffective regional integration which has hampered growth beyond national borders. 
Additionally, weak support for higher levels of domestic value addition in the auto components and 
motorcycle sectors has been exacerbated by fierce competition from Asian producers. Recent 
interventions to restart passenger vehicle assembly have only spurred superficial development 
notwithstanding some government support. The challenges facing late industrialisers are multi-
dimensional with near term solutions difficult to discern – the small Kenyan automotive sector is 
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The road to industrialisation for late industrialisers (countries) is beset with a number of challenges. They 
have to contend with; 
a) long-established industrialised countries that dominate entire industries and control the most 
lucrative sections of global value chains. 
b) newly industrialised countries still trying to carve out niches for themselves in increasingly 
competitive trade environments. 
c) globalisation of trade which has widened the geographic distribution of manufactured goods 
extending the market reach of the most efficient producers. 
The advent of global value chains has seen the integration of multiple countries in the production process 
for a single product. Industrialised incumbents control the most lucrative parts of these value chains while 
newly industrialised countries vie for positions further down. This structural hierarchy presents major 
challenges for late industrialisers. Besides acquiring the wherewithal in terms of skills, investment, and 
technology, late industrialisers are unlikely to succeed without embedding themselves in regional or 
global value chains. Yet this is not an easy endeavour especially if a country is situated in a region that 
lacks a history of industrial development. In the absence of regional value chains to participate in, a lone 
ranger approach to developing industrial capabilities is unlikely to bear fruit without unfettered access to 
a large regional market that presents opportunities for economies of scale. On the other hand, waiting for 
regional neighbours to ‘catch up’ in order to foster value chain development by segmenting production, 
spreading risks, sharing development costs, and exchanging learning experiences may behold a country’s 
industrial ambitions to the pace at which her neighbours develop theirs. This dissertation will examine a 
specific country case – Kenya, which faces such a dilemma as it attempts to develop an industrial base 
in the automotive sector. 
 
Industrialisation has been the path to economic development and prosperity since the mid-eighteenth 
century for a majority of countries in the global west (Kuznets, 1966) and more recently in the global 
east (Lin, 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains the least industrialised region of the world (UNIDO, 
2015) comprising several late industrialisers. Myriad reasons can be cited for the delayed 
industrialisation of countries across SSA. These include the long-lasting and debilitating effects of 
imperial and colonial domination, which positioned SSA countries predominantly as producers of 
primary commodities. This was compounded by minimal beneficiation of such commodities into higher 
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value products. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding half a century of self-governance, several countries 
in SSA appear unable to wean themselves off the unsustainable dependence on primary commodities. 
Such dependence appears more severe in countries endowed with non-renewable natural resources such 
as oil, precious metals and minerals and less severe for those without, who still nonetheless rely on other 
primary sectors such as agriculture for the bulk of economic productivity (Taylor, 2016). 
 
Other reasons for low industrialisation levels across SSA include a lack of sufficiently skilled labour, 
small internal markets, ineffective regional integration, shallow capital markets and insufficient foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows. Further constraints are; low innovation levels relative to other global 
regions, poor provision of public services, inadequate infrastructure (UNIDO, 2015), challenges with 
prudent management of economic resources, shortcomings with basic governance, and corruption 
(Transparency International, 2016). Suffice to say the list of drawbacks against developing industrial 
capabilities across SSA is a long one. 
 
Despite the abundant challenges, some countries in SSA have started making incremental steps towards 
transforming the structure of their economies away from dependence on the primary sector. This has 
entailed crafting appropriate policies to take advantage of endowments such as low labour costs, 
urbanisation and an expanding middle-class. Attention has also been given to skills upgrading initiatives, 
improving access to regional markets, and establishing conducive environments to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The East African Community (EAC), a regional economic bloc comprising five east 
African countries1 has several ongoing initiatives in this regard supported by multiple stakeholders 
(AfDB, 2011). Notwithstanding this, the process of converting latent endowments into benefits that yield 
positive developmental outcomes needs careful nurturing to achieve meaningful results. 
 
Kenya is classified as a lower middle-income country (World Bank, 2017) and has the largest and most 
diversified economy within the EAC. Furthermore, Kenya’s GDP of USD 70.50 billion2 (World Bank, 
2017) is the ninth largest across the continent (Table 1.0) which is noteworthy given the country’s few 
mineral endowments. With the exception of Ethiopia, seven of the eight African countries with larger 
economies enjoy economic rents from at least one major non-renewable resource3. Paradoxically, this 
                                                 
1 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
2 As of 2016 
3 With the exception of Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, the rest have significant oil and gas endowments. South Africa is 
particularly rich in precious metals and minerals, while Morocco is endowed with large deposits of phosphate, a key input in 
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may explain Kenya’s relatively faster progress towards industrialisation vis-à-vis some of her peers. The 
lack of resource dependence may have occasioned better prospects for diversification while helping avoid 
the resource curse4 phenomenon. Kenya’s semi-modern agricultural sector provides the largest 
contribution to GDP at 32.5% and employs over 70% of the labour force (KNBS, 2017). In terms of 
manufacturing capabilities, a 2015 report by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) placed Kenya significantly ahead of her EAC peers in metrics measuring manufacturing value 
added and industrial competitiveness, notwithstanding the relatively small contribution of manufacturing 
to Kenya’s GDP estimated at 9.2% in 2016 (KNBS, 2017). 
 




Country US$ billion 
 
1 Nigeria 405.0 
2 Egypt 336.2 
3 South Africa 294.8 
4 Algeria 156.0 
5 Morocco  101.4 
6 Sudan  95.6 
7 Angola  89.6 
8 Ethiopia  72.4 
9 Kenya  70.5 
10 Tanzania 47.4 
   
Source: World development indicators database, World Bank (2017) 
 
1.2 Statement of research problem 
Industrialisation across Africa has been slow; yet certain industries seem to be stuck in the infant industry 
phase despite having been in existence for decades. Kenya has had a relatively lengthy experience with 
basic motor vehicle assembly compared to most of her SSA peers who have had minimal experience in 
the sector. This notably excludes South Africa whose automobile industry is the oldest and largest across 
the continent tracing its origins back to the early decades of the 20th Century (Black, 2007). Other 
continental players of note include the north African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Egypt. Nigeria 
                                                 
the production of fertilizer. Egypt benefits from its strategic geographic location collecting rents from the Suez Canal, which 
links the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea providing shorter access between Europe and Asia. 
4 The phrase resource curse is attributed to the British Economist Richard Auty (1993) and is sometimes referred to as the 
paradox of plenty. This is when developing countries endowed with mineral wealth tend to lag behind in economic 
development and are more likely to suffer economic mismanagement due to an over-dependence on resource rents. This 
leads to the neglect of other economic sectors and minimal diversification. Furthermore, battles for control of the rents 
accruing from the resources are likely amongst political elites. 
9 
 
and Ghana in western Africa and Ethiopia in eastern Africa continue to make halting attempts to develop 
their respective industries (Black & McLennan, 2016; Deloitte, 2016). This study seeks to establish the 
constraints holding back faster development of the automotive sector in Kenya, and critically assess 
whether a viable future is discernible.  
 
The three vehicle assembly plants in Kenya were established four decades ago in the mid-seventies 
(Murage, 1983). Notwithstanding this, the automobile assembly sector has failed to move beyond very 
basic assembly. This is aggravated by a near absence of locally made components which is not only an 
indicator of the sector’s lack of progression, but also a sign that transition towards full-scale 
manufacturing is unlikely in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, it may be that the lack of 
fundamental attributes necessary for development of the sector account for the lack of progress. From a 
comparative advantage standpoint, these include; access to requisite skills, sufficient capital, and 
appropriate technology. Furthermore, the non-availability of a large market within Kenya and the east 
African region, at present, may indicate why major global carmakers are yet to engage more substantially 
with the Kenyan industry. 
 
It will also be instructive to consider the common characteristics that have impeded industrialisation 
across SSA and whether these contribute to understanding the underdevelopment of the Kenyan auto 
sector. The characteristics include post-independence industrial policies that encouraged import 
substitution industrialisation, which had the unintended consequence of nurturing and protecting 
inefficient domestic industries. Such policies were subsequently abandoned in the late 1980s’ and early 
1990s’ following the widespread adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)5 across the 
continent. In Kenya’s case, the introduction of policies liberalising trade following implementation of 
the SAP saw an influx of imports of several categories of products, including used motor vehicles from 
western and eastern markets. This is likely to have stifled prospects for development of the auto sector 
in a similar manner to the stunted outcomes observed across other manufacturing industries in Kenya as 
observed by Chege et al (2014). Other factors that held back development of the sector, and domestic 
manufacturing generally, include lengthy periods of sluggish economic growth and the dynamics that 
stalled then restarted regional economic integration in East Africa. Therefore, sector specific 
                                                 
5 Structural Adjustment Programmes were a package of policy prescriptions linked to concessional financing provided by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions i.e. The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, to a number of developing countries 
in the eighties and nineties to assist them overcome fiscal imbalances and promote open market oriented economic growth. 
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impediments will be investigated within the broader context of challenges confronting structural 
transformation, economic productivity and growth. 
 
1.3 Objectives and significance of the study 
The objectives of this study are to;  
 
i) Establish the state of the automotive sector in Kenya by examining its historic trajectory followed 
by an assessment of its future prospects. The focus is on automobile assembly as well as the emerging 
motorcycle sub-sector. 
ii) Determine constraints limiting further development of the sector and in doing so assess its long-term 
viability. This is instructive in light of attempts by several developing countries to establish national 
automotive industries, yet available evidence indicates few have had success (Mortimore, 1995; 
Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003; Busser, 2007; Wad 2009). The attendant costs of not succeeding 
can bear heavily on economies with meagre resources. Consequences range from exacerbated 
balance of payments imbalances to costly and counterproductive fiscal incentives typically in the 
form of tariff concessions. 
iii) Contribute to the discourse on challenges facing late industrialisers highlighting the need for 
accessible regional markets, and how the prominence of global value chains determines the pace of 
regional industrial development. 
 
The significance of the study is to make a further contribution to the discourse on the challenges 
confronting industrialisation in Africa. The automotive sector stands out due to the transformative role 
of motorised mobility across societies worldwide that started in the 20th century. Yet developing a 
national automotive sector in the 21st century is immensely complex and requires deployment of 
significant economic resources. A previous study evaluating the Kenyan vehicle assembly sector was 
conducted by Murage in 1983. The study found that the industry lacked scale and was characterised by 
an unsustainable proliferation of models across several marques. Over thirty years later, and in the face 
of deepened integration of global automotive value chains, this study examines how the Kenyan auto 
sector has fared. Can it find its footing within the highly integrated global industry that is currently 
experiencing disruptive change? In attempting to answer this question, the study will engage with the 





The methodology was in the main comparative and analytical. A qualitative approach involving 
identification of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature was adopted to identify suitable country 
and regional case comparisons. This factored in a chronological perspective taking into account evolving 
trends within the global automotive industry. Yin (2013) suggests a similar approach when studying 
cases where trajectories are non-linear and competing hypothesis offer evidence on achievement of 
preferred outcomes but an absence of universal consensus persists on which hypothesis is the ‘right one’. 
Murage (1983) employed a similar approach in an earlier study on the automotive sector in Kenya, while 
Okatch, et al. (2011) modified the approach with the introduction of conceptual content analysis in their 
study examining constraints to subcontracting within the vehicle assembly industry in Kenya. Guided by 
the literature on auto sector development and automotive value chains in developing regions, various 
data sources were drawn upon including information from international industry reports, official 
government statistics, and publications from recognised consulting firms. Articles published in reputable 
Kenyan and international media were also cited. The descriptive statistics were analysed alongside 
findings from stakeholder interviews carried out during a field trip to Nairobi, Kenya in February 2017. 
The field trip presented the opportunity to engage directly with industry stakeholders. This included site 
visits to two vehicle assembly plants and a local auto components manufacturer. Further, discussions 
were held with OEM franchise holders distributing new vehicles and motorcycles. A meeting with an 
official from the local auto industry’s representative body provided useful historical context. 
 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation has four sections. Following this introduction, the literature review starts by looking at 
the role of industrialisation in economic development and considers the views of early proponents on the 
subject before discussing industrialisation outcomes across SSA. The automotive industry is by nature 
complex and trying to develop a national industry, it could be argued, may be out of reach for developing 
countries with small internal markets, low skills levels, and in need of more labour absorbing industries. 
Due to a variety of reasons, foremost being available market size, strong arguments can be put forward 
as to why countries such as Kenya ought to focus instead on building capabilities in modern sectors 
where comparative advantages are more evident with clearer prospects for broader economic returns. 
This debate is given due attention by examining challenges and successes faced by other countries that 
have attempted to develop domestic auto industries. The section goes on to locate and benchmark 
Kenya’s automotive sector among those found elsewhere on the African continent. Unlike the pioneering 
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nations of the west that independently developed and then produced automobiles, the situation today is 
very different. Manufacturing processes for vehicles in the 21st century have evolved with production 
now taking place within global and regional value chains for the most part. Within these value chains, 
different countries and regions specialise in the production of several components. Ultimately, the 
components are consolidated in a central location where a complete car is assembled. For Kenya’s 
automotive production capabilities to come full circle i.e. to the point where actual manufacturing takes 
place, it is likely that Kenya would have to position itself within a regional or continental value chain. 
Obtaining an understanding of existing automotive production capabilities across the continent is thus 
useful in charting out what the future could potentially hold for the industry on the continent. 
 
Section three engages with the automotive sector in Kenya. It starts with a discussion of the performance 
of the country’s manufacturing sector to obtain a macro perspective of Kenya’s industrial landscape. This 
is followed by an in-depth review of the automotive sector, which was partially informed by stakeholder 
insights obtained from a field trip in February 2017. Additionally, the question of whether there exists 
sufficient automotive space, i.e. a large and accessible market, at a national and regional level is explored. 
With the exception of large national markets such as those found in the United States, China and India, 
few countries possess the scale of market necessary to independently sustain a domestic auto industry. 
As such, prospects for the Kenyan auto industry becoming a hub for the east African region are assessed. 
This section also gives due attention to the motorcycle, both the conventional two-wheeler and the three-
wheeler tuk tuk. The rise in popularity of motorcycles and tuk tuks’ across the developing world, first in 
Asia and more recently in Africa cannot be overlooked. Driven mostly by affordability in regions with 
vast numbers of low-income earners, the motorcycle has emerged as an alternative transport medium. 
This is especially so in cities suffering the dual maladies of poor transport infrastructure and inadequate 
public transport which have led to chronic traffic congestion. The majority of motorcycles on Kenyan 
roads are imported as unassembled kits that undergo local assembly. Prospects for achievement of higher 
levels of local content during assembly, beyond the labour required to assemble the kits, will be discussed 
here. According to the literature, the growth of domestic components production has been a key aspect 
of the more successful attempts at automotive sector development. 
 
Section four concludes by consolidating the study’s findings. A summary of Kenya’s automotive sector 
is presented, highlighting the various challenges faced in trying to develop capabilities in a highly 
sophisticated industry; these include skills and technology deficits, as well as a lack of necessary market 
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attributes nationally and regionally. As a globally integrated industry, the hurdles late industrialisers must 
overcome to achieve meaningful engagement with the industry’s value chains is highlighted. These 
challenges point to the urgent need for appropriate, cohesive and coordinated industrial and trade policy 




2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 The automotive sector in developing countries 
The automotive sector is one of the largest industrial sectors globally encompassing highly sophisticated 
manufacturing processes across the various levels of its core and associated value chains (Barnes et al, 
2017). Due to globalisation, it has also evolved into a highly integrated sector with automotive 
manufacturing clusters spanning across continental regions whilst forming part of global value chains 
that transcend continental boundaries (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003). As such, the depth and breadth 
of a country’s industrialisation landscape are essential first order determinants for successful 
development of the sector. This necessitates the need to examine the industrial capabilities of a country 
and more broadly the regional industrial landscape to discern the sector’s chances for success. Section 
2.2 does this by engaging with the literature on industrialisation in Africa. Furthermore, to participate in 
the sector in a manner that yields economic benefits as well as positive spill over effects, such as the 
development of ancillary industries, developing countries need to attract the ‘right kind’ of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Barnes et al, 2017). More specifically, this relates to investment interventions targeted 
at upgrading the sector’s technological capabilities as well as development of local supply chains for 
automotive components. At a macro level, given the sector’s heavy reliance on foreign inputs particularly 
in its early stages of development, when availability of locally produced components is likely to be low, 
close attention should be paid to the sector’s consumption of scarce foreign exchange resources 
(Mortimore, 1995). 
 
Attempts to establish auto sectors across the developing world started in earnest in the first half of the 
twentieth century. From the 1950s onwards, developing countries made use of import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) policies to support further advancement of the sector (Humphrey & Memedovic, 
2003; Barnes & Morris, 2008; Wad, 2009). Although support from ISI policies was instrumental in 
protecting domestic industries, it occurred at the expense of production efficiency and international 
competitiveness (Mortimore, 1995; Humphrey & Memodovic, 2003). Development of a successful 
automotive industry has long been perceived as validation of a country’s industrialisation strategy, and 
a visible sign of economic transformation (Mortimore, 1995). Due to the sector’s technological 
complexity, embedded within extensive value chains, this perception is not misplaced. If a country can 
develop a functioning and viable automotive sector, it is likely to have acquired the technological 
capabilities and productive efficiencies to succeed in other less complex industries. However, beyond 
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pursuing development of the sector for reasons of national prestige and industrial self-reliance, there are 
critical elements that developing countries ought to consider in order to nurture the growth of the sector. 
While no defined formula exists given each country’s unique circumstantial attributes and endowments, 
existence of the following elements is vital; 
i) existence of an automotive space (Black & McLennan, 2016) 
ii) integration of the domestic industry into regional and global value chains (Humphrey & 
Memedovic, 2003) 
iii) access to regional and international export markets preferably in emerging regions (Wad, 2009) 
In addition to the above, Humphrey and Oeter (2000) highlight other factors that contribute in equal 
measure to shaping the trajectory of a country’s auto sector. These encompass strengthening domestic 
manufacturing capabilities, particularly labour skills and facilitating the access to and upgrading of 
technology for assemblers and component producers. Furthermore, supportive industrial and trade 
policies are essential to provide a degree of support to fledgling auto industries in terms of domestic 
protection on one hand and regional and international access on the other. Such support should however 
be rationalised as the sector matures and becomes more integrated within global value chains. 
With regards to the requirement for an automotive space, conceptualisation of the different types of viable 
automotive spaces is necessary. By necessity, factories producing automotive products must operate at 
economies of scale. It is thus essential that national or regional markets are large enough to absorb 
production output or access to export markets exists. The conceptual frameworks used to describe the 
different types of automotive spaces as illustrated by Humphrey and Oeter (2000) are; 
a) Protected autonomous markets - these are by nature large markets such as those found in China 
and India, which have high levels of trade protection. Given the large populations within these 
economies and the growing purchasing power of an expanding middle class, global auto 
manufacturers are compelled to situate production domestically even if the terms governing market 
access may require concessions in aspects such as ownership. The scale of the markets may also 
allow locally grown brands the opportunity to flourish usually after collaborating with a foreign 
manufacturer from whom vital technology is acquired, and diffused into domestic production 
processes. 
b) Integrated peripheral markets – this type of automotive space is enabled by access to and 
integration with a large and established automotive market such as that found in the European Union 
or within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. Typically, auto sectors situated 
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in peripheral markets gain access to larger established markets by virtue of geographic proximity 
and lower production costs. These features can lead to integration of production value chains across 
the peripheral market and the established one, which enables the peripheral market’s auto sector to 
develop in scale and levels of competency that would have been difficult to attain by relying solely 
on the domestic market. 
c) Emerging regional markets – automotive spaces found in these markets typically start as a 
collection of national auto sectors that are unlikely to possess the characteristics required for 
successful independent growth. However, effective and well-coordinated regional integration can 
spur automotive production growth across a regional economic zone. Output is absorbed within the 
regional market as well as export markets situated further afield. This is best exemplified by the East 
Asian flying geese model where one country spearheads a regional value chain (Mortimore, 1995; 
Wad 2009) with the formation of production value chains being analogous to that of a formation of 
flying geese. The division of labour within a successful regional value chain is such that countries 
focus on areas of strength and competence with minimal duplication. 
2.2 Global automotive value chains 
The evolution of global automotive value chains has been instrumental in enhancing the development of 
auto sectors in some developing countries starting from the last decade of the twentieth century. 
Humphrey and Memedovic (2003) illustrate how globalisation trends spurred a shift in the balance of 
production from the Triad regions6 to emerging markets in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Central 
Europe as well as India, China and Mexico. Hitherto, auto production in countries within these regions 
had grown incrementally under the protection of ISI policies and market-seeking FDI by multinational 
corporations (MNCs), but had not yet become a significant source of global supply. This began to change 
with mounting pressure for trade liberalisation coming from multilateral institutions around the turn of 
the century. Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), common in many emerging countries, came 
under attack (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; Barnes & Morris, 2008) prompting auto MNCs to 
streamline emerging market based production by integrating operations both regionally and globally. 
Continuing improvements in production capabilities within emerging markets as well as follow-sourcing 
by tier one component suppliers, seeking to locate production facilities closer to those of principal firms, 
further aided the increase in emerging markets output. Ultimately, these dynamics led to the emergence 
                                                 
6 North America, the European Union and Japan are referred to as the Triad regions given the early dominance their original 
equipment manufacturers (i.e. major automobile brands) had on the global industry. 
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of regional production systems, particularly in Southeast Asia, with regional value chains becoming an 
integral part of larger global automotive value chains. 
 
2.3 The examples of Mexico and Thailand 
Following the discussions on the importance of upgrading domestic manufacturing capabilities, 
supportive industrial and trade policies, and the emergence and evolution of regional value chains, this 
section draws on insights from the experience of two developing countries. Mexico and Thailand have 
developed successful automotive industries despite initial attributes indicating the contrary. As such, a 
review of their respective auto industries will assist in the discussion further ahead on the possibilities 
and challenges facing the auto sectors in Africa and specifically the one in Kenya. 
 
Mexico 
Mexico’s automobile assembly sector dates its origins back to the 1920s where passenger vehicles were 
assembled from completely knocked down (CKD) kits7. From the early 1960s to the early 1980s, the 
sector underwent a period of expansion and consolidation under the protection of import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) policies (Mortimore, 1995; Carillo, 2000). The result was a twelve-fold increase 
in production capacity from 50,000 to 600,000 units. However, this expansion was characterised by 
inefficiencies due to the use of outdated technologies, which resulted in overpriced vehicles. 
Furthermore, the sector had a negative impact on Mexico’s balance of payments due to a heavy reliance 
on foreign inputs, juxtaposed against low automotive exports. As such, the sector’s competitive outlook 
at the start of the 1980s was decidedly weak. However, a remarkable transformation occurred over the 
last two decades of the 20th century led by a rapid and sustained expansion of exports (Mortimore, 1995). 
Exports of passenger vehicles grew ten-fold from approximately 50,000 units per annum in the mid-
1980s to 500,000 units by the mid-1990s. Mortimore (1995) highlights the convergence of factors 
responsible for the transformation, grouped into three categories namely;  
i) international market factors 
ii) corporate strategies of major automakers 
iii) Mexico’s national automobile policy 
                                                 
7 Varying definitions exist to describe completely knocked down kits (CKDSs) but essentially these are auto components 
that are delivered to an auto assembler from an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the form of kits with each kit 
containing all the essential parts necessary to assemble the complete vehicle. The assembler then assembles the vehicle 
starting with the welding of the frame.  
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In the first category, Mortimore describes how North American and European automakers found their 
global dominance under threat from the emerging Japanese auto industry which was proving more 
efficient and whose products were rapidly gaining global presence. This prompted the second category 
of factors i.e. a change in strategies for North American and European automakers.  To the benefit of 
Mexico’s auto sector, American automakers instigated strategies to protect market shares at home, which 
resulted in technological upgrading of subsidiary production facilities situated in Mexico and deeper 
integration with lead production facilities in the United States (Carillo, 2012). Mexico’s low cost 
production base coupled with geographic proximity were undoubtedly key influencing factors, 
effectively characterising the Mexican automotive space as an integrated peripheral market. This 
ultimately resulted in up to two thirds of Mexican passenger vehicle production being exported to the 
United States by 1994. Additionally, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the 
United States, Mexico and Canada, which came into effect in 1994, provided additional stimulus for 
trade in automotive products (vehicles and components) between Mexican auto plants and those in the 
United States. Thirdly, as ISI policies were phased out, the national automobile policy evolved in a 
manner that granted automakers the flexibility to further integrate output from Mexican plants with 
production from international operations. Such was the success of the auto industry due to these changing 
dynamics that by 1993 it accounted for 16% of Mexico’s total exports and was a notable supplier of 
vehicles and auto components in OECD markets (Mortimore, 1995). 
 
Thailand 
Thailand has been referred to as ‘Detroit of the East’ (Thailand’s booming car industry…, 2013) given 
the remarkable success of the country’s automotive industry; especially post the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98. Production increased rapidly between 2000 - 2007 rising 280% to 1.2 million units 
(Wad, 2009). The global financial crisis in 2008-09 intervened to slow down growth but by 2012 the 
industry had recovered with production rising to 2.45 million units (Thailand’s booming car industry…, 
2013), a remarkable 650% increase from twelve years prior. With exports in 2012 accounting for 
approximately 1 million units or 40% of production, Thailand was the 7th largest automobile exporter 
globally.  
The success of Thailand’s auto sector stands out given the different outcomes encountered by regional 
neighbours Malaysia, Indonesia and The Philippines who also sought to develop national industries. 
Similarly, to Mexico, Thailand’s auto sector initially developed with support of government policies 
geared towards import substitution industrialisation (Busser, 2007; Wad, 2009; Natsuda & Thoburn, 
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2012). Such policies, which emphasised local content in production along with imposition of high tariff 
walls, did not result in enhanced international competitiveness. Notwithstanding this, the design of local 
content guidelines did have a lasting developmental impact with thresholds set for local content levels 
being exceeded by firms even after removal of mandatory limits in 1998 (Barnes et al, 2017). Another 
similarity to Mexico was the presence of foreign automakers, Japanese and American firms, that had 
established plants in Thailand to supply the domestic market i.e. market-seeking FDI. The East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 precipitated a slump in the domestic market prompting an outward focus by 
Thai-based automakers (Wad, 2009; Doner & Wad, 2014). Government was supportive and trade and 
industrial policies were adjusted in a manner that enabled automakers to integrate into regional and global 
value chains, while orienting production towards higher levels of exports (Wad, 2009; Barnes et al, 
2017).  
Other measures that helped shape the Thai auto sector and position it as a competitive player in regional 
and global export markets included; policy interventions encouraging large scale production – achieved 
by controlling the permitted number of assemblers, tax based export incentive schemes, and support for 
formation of industrial clusters for auto component manufacturers (Natsuda & Thoburn, 2012). 
Furthermore, attributes such as relatively low labour costs and ease of access to affordable infrastructure 
helped boost the sector’s competitiveness (Barnes et al, 2017). It is interesting to note that protective 
measures, in particular high import tariffs, limiting access to the domestic market were not abandoned. 
Instead, the right mix of trade and industrial policy measures proved successful in re-positioning the Thai 
auto sector. 
In summary, the success in enhancing competitiveness of Thailand’s auto sector can be attributed to three 
main factors; 
i) integration into regional and global value chains comprising global automakers and tier one suppliers 
of components 
ii) fiscal support through tax-based export incentives that helped facilitate access into emerging 
regional and global export markets 
iii) supportive government policies that helped transition the sector from an ISI nurtured inward looking 
orientation towards one encompassing enhanced international competitiveness. 
The pivotal moments for the Mexican and Thai auto sectors came about during a transformative period 
for the global auto industry, which occurred over the last two decades of the twentieth century. The 
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governance structures underpinning global automotive value chains evolved from being mostly producer 
driven towards a more relational association between global automakers and tier one suppliers i.e. those 
suppliers near the top of the value chain hierarchy (Sturgeon et al, 2008). This closer association entailed 
deeper collaboration in the production process and stimulated greater geographical linkages whereby tier 
one suppliers would ‘follow’ automakers around the globe by establishing production facilities in close 
proximity. With reference to this study, the transformation of the Mexican and Thai auto industries 
demonstrates the vital importance of viable automotive spaces for a national industry to develop and 
thrive. In Mexico’s case, as an integrated peripheral market, the industry’s proximity to the large U.S 
market created opportunities for value chain integration when the competitive pressures faced by 
American auto firms prompted the search for a lower-cost production base. While in Thailand’s case, the 
right mix of industrial and trade policies enabled the sector to emerge as the ‘lead goose’ in an emerging 
regional market that was of interest to global automakers. 
 
2.4 Industrialisation and structural transformation in Africa 
The path towards industrialisation for many African countries has been a bumpy one with initial attempts 
in the 1970’s and 80’s characterised mostly as a failure (Ajakaiye & Page, 2012). Several observers have 
provided insight to the discourse. McMillan et. al, (2014) find the contribution of manufacturing to GDP 
for several countries across the continent has hardly moved beyond the 15% level where it was in the 
1960’s and 70’s. With specific regard to sub-Saharan Africa, Newman et. al, (2016) find the average 
share of manufacturing value added in GDP was approximately 10% in 2012. More alarmingly, using 
panel data from 49 countries, Gui-Diby and Renard (2015) find the share of manufacturing value added 
across Africa decreased at an annual average rate of 5.68% between 1980 – 2009 indicating 
deindustrialisation. It could be argued the decline in the share of manufacturing appears more pronounced 
given the recent rapid growth of other sectors such as mining and services. The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) concurs with the deindustrialisation hypothesis in its Economic Report 
on Africa (2015) although notes that manufacturing has been growing in absolute terms but at a very 
slow pace. The sector has not kept up with GDP growth and has grown noticeably slower than other 





Table 2.0: Overall and sectoral GDP growth in Africa (% per annum) 
Growth  1961-1979 1980-1999 2000-2012 
GDP 4.9 2.4 4.9 
Agriculture  3.3 3.3 3.6 
Industry*  6.1 1.5 5.2 
Manufacturing 4.4 1.7 3.1 
Services  4.5 3.0 5.6 
*Industry includes mining, electricity etc.  
Source: UNECA, 2015: 47 
 
The slow pace of manufacturing growth in Africa contrasts poorly against Asia where the share of 
manufacturing has grown more rapidly, increasing at an average rate of 8% between 1980-2009 (Gui-
Diby and Renard, 2015). Furthermore, according to the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) Africa underperformed other emerging and developing regions in the realm of 
manufactured exports (UNIDO, 2015) as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Emerging and developing regions manufacturing exports (billions, current US$) 
Region  1995 2005 2013 
Emerging industrial countries* 653 1,944 4,256 
Asia and Pacific± 346 1,291 3,371 
Latin America^ 213 460 733 
Africa§ 41 110 212 
*As classified by UNIDO, comprising; Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, India, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Mauritius, Mexico, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South 
Africa, Suriname, Thailand, Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela 
± As classified by UNIDO comprising 48 developing and emerging economies in the region excluding the following 
industrialised and high-income economies; Bahrain, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Macao, Malaysia, Qatar, 
Singapore, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates 
^ As classified by UNIDO comprising 37 Latin American countries 
§ As classified by UNIDO comprising all countries on the African continent and the island nations of Cabo Verde, 
Comoros, Mauritius, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. 
 
Source: adapted from UNIDO, 2015: 184 
 
Several factors are attributable to the dismal performance of manufacturing growth in Africa over the 
last half century. These include general economic decline in the last two decades of the 20th century 
occasioned in part by commodity and debt crises (Van de Walle, 2001; Deaton, 1999), as well as 
shortcomings in management of natural resource rents. Furthermore, neoliberal economic policies 
adopted under structural adjustment programs (SAPs) dispensed with trade protection for the few existing 
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domestic industries, which had been established and nurtured under import substitution industrialisation. 
On one hand, this ameliorated the burden domestic industries placed on scarce foreign exchange 
resources due to reliance on foreign inputs. On the other, it exposed local industries to international 
competition from regions with more efficient industries particularly those situated in Asia (Ajakaiye & 
Page, 2012; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2007).  
At the crux of Africa’s inability to industrialise is the lack of structural transformation with several 
economies in SSA still reliant on primary sector productivity for growth and development. Poor 
management of scarce fiscal resources, skills and knowledge gaps, technology deficits, unfriendly 
business environments and infrastructure gaps are some of the factors holding back the pace of economic 
transformation. Yet the significant productivity gains likely from manufacturing are well documented. 
Ajakaiye and Page (2012) note the estimated manufacturing-agriculture labour productivity ratio for low-
income Africa as 2.5 to 1.0, while McMillan et. al, (2014) provide an estimate of 2.3. This compares to 
Latin America’s ratio of 2.8 and Asia’s of 3.9. The productivity gains from manufacturing are clear and 
from the examples of other developing regions, the scope for Africa to enhance these gains beyond 
current levels exists. 
McMillan et. al, (2014) also note the lingering side effects of trade liberalisation in several African 
countries. Imports of manufactured goods, initially from western countries, were replaced by low priced 
imports from the Far East and in particular China at the turn of the century. This contributed to 
deindustrialisation and the transfer of labour from small, and often struggling, manufacturing industries 
back to agriculture or informal retail activity8. More recently, the collapse of global commodity prices 
has had similar effects on the movement of labour from high productivity mining back to low productivity 
agriculture and informal retail. McMillan, et al (2014) observe this in two resource dependant economies, 
Nigeria and Zambia, following the collapse of oil and copper prices.  
Appropriate and effective public policy interventions are necessary to transform the structure of most 
African economies. Ajakaiye and Page (2012) discuss literature contributions advancing arguments for 
public interventions in four broad areas, namely; 
i) Bridging of critical gaps in infrastructure, skills and technology. 
ii) Spatial industrial policies in the form of well-functioning special economic zones – mostly to counter 
the challenges around poor and unfriendly business environments 
                                                 
8 Typically retailing imported wares from China on street pavements in urban areas. 
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iii) Attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) for capital formation and knowledge acquisition 
iv) Fiscal incentives that are well thought out, rigorously applied and time bound 
Cimoli et. al, (2008) discuss the importance of ‘capabilities accumulation’ with regards to industrial 
development arguing the importance of national systems of innovation and technological learning that 
are sustainably accumulative. Citing Freeman (2008) they go on to elucidate that innovation and 
knowledge acquisition are not sufficient enough conditions in and of themselves but need to be 
juxtaposed against five sub-domains governing; 
i) the generation of scientific knowledge 
ii) the development, improvement, adoption of new techniques of production 
iii) the economic machine which organises the production and distribution of goods, services and 
incomes, and together, information flows and patterns of incentive amongst economic agents; 
iv) the political and legal structure; 
v) the cultural domain, shaping values, norms and customs 
The observations of Cimoli et. al, point to a long road ahead for industrialisation across Africa that goes 
beyond the narrow sectoral focus of enhancing manufacturing capabilities. Rather an overhaul to the 
process of developing and sustaining capabilities is necessary especially in the domains of scientific 
knowledge and innovation. However, in a globalised trade environment structural transformation should 
go hand in hand with measures seeking integration into global value chains for industries where it is 
imperative to do so such as the auto sector (Gereffi & Sturgeon, 2013). For industries where global 
integration is less of a necessity, effective regional integration measures are necessary to achieve critical 
scale.  
2.5 The automotive industry in Africa 
When examining the automotive industry in Africa, it is useful to do so from two vantage points, namely;  
i) Productive capacity  
ii) Trade in automotive products 
At first glance, there appears to be a dichotomy as productive capacity does not appear to be moving in 
tandem with automotive trade across the continent. 
 
Productive capacity remains small across the continent vis-à-vis growing volumes of automotive trade. 
This is illustrated by statistics from 2013, the most recent year where statistics suitable for an indicative 
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comparison are available9. Global production statistics published by the International Organisation of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, known by its French acronym OICA (Organisation Internationale des 
Constructeurs d’Automobiles), reveal the number of automobiles manufactured in Africa accounted for 
less than 1% of global production in 2013 or just under 650,000 units. This is juxtaposed against a net 
automotive trade deficit across SSA10 of USD 16.3 billion (Black & McLennan, 2016). It is also 
important to note that imports comprise mostly used vehicles from western markets. Due to low per 
capita incomes and the absence of consumer vehicle finance in many countries in SSA, automobile 
purchases are often self-financed placing affordability above other considerations11. With the average 
SSA per capita income standing at USD 1,58812 (World Bank, 2016), most consumers find the purchase 
of brand new vehicles beyond reach. Imported used cars therefore provide an affordable alternative at a 
fraction of the cost. For example, a consumer in Kenya can purchase a used passenger vehicle from Japan 
for USD 5,500 (Deloitte, 2016) which is approximately 4 times the average per capita Kenyan income 
of USD 1,340 (World Bank, 2016). The cost of a similar but brand new vehicle is likely to be more than 
20 times annual per capita income or higher. 
 
The few automotive exports from the continent originate from subsidiaries of global automakers of 
western or eastern origin i.e. European, American and Asian brands. The continent’s leading exporters, 
South Africa and Morocco, export a significant share of output to markets in Europe and North America 
while vying for domestic market share against imports. Levels of intracontinental automotive trade are 
low in comparison to other regions but growing. For instance, in 2016 exports to African countries 
accounted for 18.3% of South Africa’s total automotive exports while exports to the European Union 
accounted for 50.3% (AIEC, 2017). This scenario points to the potential for market entry of producers 
of low-cost vehicles to meet the continent’s automotive demand that is nonetheless undermined by 
limited purchasing power. A number of other constraints exist such as a paucity of technological 
capabilities as well as limited human resource skills compounding the challenges of developing 
continental-wide or regional automotive clusters. Limited auto component production further hinders 
                                                 
9 In the absence of a central repository capturing details of all aspects of the Continent’s automotive trade, reliance is placed 
on several sources most of which rely on self-declaration of production statistics and trade flows from the continent’s fifty-
four nations. 
10 The automotive trade deficit refers exclusively to sub-Saharan Africa i.e. excluding North Africa, while the production 
statistics published by OICA include North Africa. The only exporter of motor vehicles in sub-Saharan Africa is South 
Africa. In North Africa, the leading exporter is Morocco. 
11 South Africa is the exception within SSA where local automotive production meets a significant proportion of local demand 
and comprehensive consumer vehicle finance is available. 
12 In 2015 
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development of supply chains and non-tariff barriers, particularly underdeveloped infrastructure, pose 
long-term challenges. With this in mind, a closer look at the few countries involved in automobile 
production is necessary to gain an understanding of the continental automotive landscape. 
 
2.5.1 Production 
In 2016, just under 95 million motor vehicles were manufactured globally with Africa’s contribution at 
just over 1 million units, slightly above 1% of global production (OICA, 2016). Africa’s miniscule 
contribution originated from a handful of countries (Table 2.2). This is noteworthy considering the 
continent comprises 54 countries with an estimated population of 1.2 billion (World Bank, 2016), but 
has the lowest motorisation rate globally estimated at 44 vehicles per 1,000 people (Deloitte, 2016). This 
compares to the global average of 180 vehicles/ 1,000 with other developing regions faring much better 
than Africa. For instance, the motorisation rate for the Middle East and developing Asia is estimated at 
79, while Latin America’s is estimated at 176 vehicles per 1,000. 
 
Also noteworthy are the widely varied output levels among African automotive producers with South 
Africa commanding the lion’s share at 58% of total production in 2016, having declined from an even 
larger share of 63% the year prior. 
 
Table 2.2: Motor Vehicle Production in Africa (units) 
  2015 % of Total 2016 % of Total % Change 
South Africa 616 082  63% 599 004  58% -3% 
Morocco 288 337  30% 345 106  33% 20% 
Egypt 36 000  4% 36 230  4% 1% 
Algeria 19 346  2% 42 008  4% 117% 
Kenya 10,181 1% 6,577 1% -35% 
Nigeria 3,600* 0.4% 4 000* 0.4 11% 
 
973 122  100% 1 032 925  100%  
Sources: OICA correspondents survey (2016), SA Automotive Export Manual (2017), PwC Nigeria (2016-
17), Deloitte Africa (2017), Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2017) 
* Nigeria’s production figures are estimates based on industry interviews conducted by PwC Nigeria. 
 
The African automotive market is not homogeneous just as are the 54 countries on the continent. It is 




2.5.2 South Africa 
In many respects, South Africa is an outlier when it comes to motor vehicle production on the continent 
given the lengthy history of the country’s automotive industry. The industry in South Africa dates back 
to the 1920s with the assembly of the first car in Africa – Ford’s Model T (SA Dept. of Trade & Industry, 
2015) heralding the start of the industry. Despite proximity challenges and a small internal market by 
global standards, the industry has grown over the decades to become a key manufacturing sector in the 
South African economy making an estimated cumulative contribution of 7.4% of GDP13 in 2016, 
comprising 4.7% from automotive manufacturing and 2.7% from associated retail trade, according to 
industry figures published by the Automotive Industry Export Council (2017). The proximity challenges 
stem from the long distance exports have to travel to reach the sector’s main export markets in Europe, 
North America and Asia. Paradoxically the export market nearest to South Africa i.e. sub-Saharan Africa 
continues to have inherent market access barriers. These include poor infrastructure, weak but growing 
consumer purchasing power, and an influx of cheap imports of used vehicles from Europe and Asia. 
 
According to the South African Automotive Industry Export Council (AIEC) no less than seven major 
global automakers have production facilities in South Africa14. These are; BMW, Ford, General Motors, 
Mercedes Benz, Nissan, Toyota and Volkswagen. Additionally, a robust supply chain exists comprising 
over 120 tier one suppliers. These include global players such as Yazaki, Sumitomo and Bosch among 
other major auto component manufacturers. The number of tier two and three suppliers, mostly local 
firms, numbers well over 200 according to the Department of Trade & Industry (2015). Given its breadth 
and depth, the South African auto sector stands out amongst the few across the continent, which are still 
in varying stages of early development. 
 
Table 2.3: Selected Performance Indicators for the South African Auto Sector 
  2015 2016 
Broader industry contribution to GDP* 7.5% 7.4% 
Share of manufacturing output 33.5% 33.0% 
Average monthly employment by automakers 31 260 30 953 
Average employment by Component manufacturers 82 100 82 000 
Number of vehicles produced 616 082 599 004 
                                                 
13 South Africa’s GDP was estimated to be worth USD 314 billion in 2015 (OECD, 2016). South Africa’s economy is 
considered one of the top three largest economies on the African continent. 
14 As of 2016. 
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Number of vehicles exported 333 847 344 859 
Exports as % of production 54% 58% 
Automotive export value as % of SA total exports 14.6% 15.6% 
Top export market in value terms EU EU 
1. * the contribution to GDP is made up of contributions from manufacturing as well as associated retail trade 
Sources: AIEC (2016), NAAMSA (2016), NAACAM (2016), OICA (2016) 
 
The automotive sector is a major employer in South Africa employing well over 100,000 workers, with 
auto component firms providing over 72% of employment (AIEC, 2017). Growth and sustainability of 
the industry over the decades has in large part been a result of supportive national and sub-national 
initiatives. Successive programmes have been set in motion that offer a mix of tariff incentives, fiscal 
grants and tax rebates all aimed at supporting and boosting production capabilities along the entire value 
chain. At present the Automotive Production and Development Programme (APDP) is the flagship 
national programme while at the provincial level a number of programmes that address vicinity-specific 
needs are in place (AIEC, 2016). In addition, further support is available from industry associations of 
which the major ones are the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa 
(NAAMSA) and the National Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM). 
 
While still a relatively small player on the global automotive stage and notwithstanding the significant 
government support, the automotive industry can be viewed as an overall positive contributor to the 
South African economy. Prospects for further growth of exports could materialise in the medium to long 
term should the economic performance of countries in SSA improve. A key consideration for African 
countries seeking to develop a national industry, such as Kenya, is whether to seek integration with the 
established South African auto sector or try go it alone. The discussion on the Kenyan auto sector ahead 
will explore the viability of this option in light of recent developments within the local industry.    
 
2.5.3 Morocco 
Morocco is the second largest producer of automobiles in Africa. The country’s flagship production 
facility is the Renault majority-owned plant in the northwestern port city of Tangier. The plant 
commenced production in 2012 following an investment of EUR 1.0 billion (Saleh, 2016). The plant 
started with an annual production capacity of 170,000 vehicles from one assembly line producing two 
models namely; Logan, a sedan sized hatchback and Dokker, a light panel van. In 2015, the plant 
produced 229,000 cars, a 32% increase from the prior year’s output (Saleh, 2016) with the bulk of 
production destined for three markets in Europe; Spain, France and Germany.  
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Introduction of a second assembly line is expected to boost production to 400,000 vehicles a year 
positioning it as the largest plant on the continent. The factory had a workforce of 5,086 employees as of 
December 2014 (Renault, 2014), with an estimated 30,000 indirect jobs created according to the 
Moroccan Association for Automotive Industry and Trade (2013). 
 
Given Morocco’s geographic proximity to Europe by sea, the automotive space occupied by the auto 
sector has the hallmark features of an integrated peripheral market serving export markets mainly in the 
Europe Union and to a lesser extent its own domestic market. The free trade agreement with the European 
Union, in place since 200015, has been a key component of the sector’s development and viability. The 
sector’s export strategy has the strong support of the Moroccan government enjoying a raft of incentives 
which, in addition to low labour costs16, make Morocco an attractive investment destination for European 
automakers. Among incentives available for industrial focused FDI of which the automotive sector17 is 
a primary target, are; 
- Exemption from income tax for the first 5-years i.e. 0%, followed by a rate of 8.75% for the next 25-
years 
- Zero-rated Value Added Tax on imports of capital equipment and manufacturing inputs 
- Zero-rated Value Added Tax on exports 
- No withholding taxes on dividends 
- Limited financial support towards professional building costs and equipment costs for investors 
operating in designated Special Economic Zones. This support is capped at EUR 1.8 million or 10% 
of the total project cost. 
 
The Moroccan automotive sector is considered progressively successful with exports of automotive 
products earning USD 2.74 billion in 2013 or approximately 10% of overall exports (Maturana et al, 
2015). Of significance is the rapidly developing domestic supply chain comprising international and local 
manufacturers of components. Locally produced components make up to 43% of inputs used in the 
production process, and include plastics, electronic components and fabricated metal parts (Maturana et 
                                                 
15 The EU is Morocco’s biggest trading partner and as of 2015 accounted for 56% of Morocco’s international trade and 61% 
of her exports. During the 10-yr period 2006-2016 Morocco enjoyed annual trade surpluses over the EU of a cumulative value 
of EUR 66 billion (European Commission, 2017). 
16 Employees working in Moroccan auto plants earn as little as a third of the wages of their counterparts working in European 
auto plants. 
17 This includes automobile and component manufacturers (Moroccan Association for Automotive Industry and Trade, 2013) 
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al, 2015). Local parts producers are also increasingly targeting export markets in Europe and markets as 
far afield as South America. 
In summary, the Moroccan auto sector’s integrated peripheral market positioning which has enabled 
value chain integration with the EU automotive sector is vital to its sustainability. While the domestic 
market is relatively large compared to markets found elsewhere on the African continent, close 
geographical integration with EU automotive value chains is the key ingredient for future growth of the 
sector. Our case study country, Kenya, clearly lacks this essential attribute. 
 
2.5.4 Egypt 
Egypt’s automotive sector as it stands today emerged on the basis of import substitution industrialisation 
policies (ISI) dating back to the 1960’s. During this period automotive assembly was monopolised by 
the state run El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company and was targeted to cater solely for the 
domestic market (Haddad et. el, 2015). A change of government and political ideology in the late 1970’s 
led to liberalisation of the economy. This brought with it involvement of the private sector, which in the 
automotive sector resulted in production agency agreements and joint venture arrangements with major 
multinational automakers. The industry developed over the years to encompass 15 assembly plants and 
75 firms within the supply chain providing components and services to the assembly plants with an 
overall industry capacity to 300,000 units18 annually (Oxford Business Group, 2016). Despite the 
seeming progress made over the years, Egypt’s automotive industry has faced headwinds in recent times 
following a) the revolution of 2011 that marked the commencement of the ‘Arab Spring’ and b) increased 
pressure from foreign imports due to decreasing tariff protection measures following the establishment 
of a free trade agreement with the EU in 200419. 
 
The loss of trade protection has seen a gradual decline in import duties on fully built units with complete 
tariff elimination due by 2019. This has progressively made imported vehicles, from an OEM and 
distributorship standpoint, relatively cheaper to deliver to the market than to undertake local assembly. 
The near term prognosis for Egypt’s auto sector remains uncertain notwithstanding increased lobbying 
by politically connected stakeholders to raise non-tariff barriers on imports as a way of propping up the 
local industry (Haddad et. el, 2015). Without integration into a regional value chain within the MENA 
                                                 
18 Cars and buses 
19 Referred to as the ‘Association Agreement’, the EU-Egypt free trade agreement removed or decreased tariffs on industrial 
products and made agricultural products easier to trade. 
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region, the sector may increase its reliance on trade protection for survival, which demonstrates the 
challenges for national auto sectors that lack access to a viable automotive space. 
 
2.5.5 Algeria 
With a per capita income of USD 4,794 per annum, Algeria is considered the second-largest market for 
automobiles in Africa, after South Africa. Total sales reached a peak in 2013 estimated at 425,000 units 
(Belalloufi, 2017) most of which were imports of new cars. Following the peak, estimates indicate a 
reduction in domestic demand due to significant declines in oil and gas revenues, which constitute 95% 
of Algeria’s exports. This has been coupled with government measures to curb imports across the board 
by progressively reducing the issuance of import licenses. 
 
Despite having one of the larger markets on the continent, Algeria is relatively new to automobile 
production. Renault, which is the market leader with an estimated market share of 25% (Renault, 2014), 
opened an assembly and manufacturing plant, Renault Algérie Production (RAP), in November 2014 in 
the Oran region. According to Renault an investment of Euro 50 million was deployed to set up the plant 
which in a joint venture (JV) with two local partners. This investment, which is relatively small by 
international standards, will entail an initial production outturn of 25,000 vehicles per annum that will be 
scaled up to 75,000 units by 2019. 
 
Other automakers have shown interest in the market. They include, China’s Anhui Jianghuai Automobile 
Company (JAC Motors) who have announced plans to establish a light-duty truck assembly plant (JAC 
signs deal to open…, 2016) at a cost USD 128 million. Initial production is set at 10,000 units per year. 
The Volkswagen (VW) Group has also declared intentions to set up a passenger vehicle assembly plant 
via a USD 170 million joint venture investment with the local VW distributor (Reuters, 2016).  
 
The long-term viability of the fledgling Algerian automotive industry is difficult to assess at this stage 
notwithstanding the recent investments by Renault, and upcoming ones by JAC Motors and VW. The 
question arises whether what was once a lucrative automotive market for imports will experience a return 
to the demand levels prevalent during the era of higher oil prices. This considered, Algeria’s proximity 
to Morocco where the automotive industry is more established could potentially present opportunities 
for an integrated regional value chain, producing vehicles and auto components for the respective 





Although a marginal producer by continental standards, the Nigerian auto sector deserves mention mostly 
for what could be achieved rather than what has been achieved. To start with, the Nigerian economy is 
the largest on the continent 20 with GDP estimated at USD 405 billion in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). 
Nigeria is also the most populous nation on the continent with an estimated population of 183 million 
(OECD, 2016). The Nigerian economy however is heavily dependent on oil and gas, which jointly 
account for 35% of GDP and over 90% of exports. 
 
Total motor vehicle sales were estimated at over 400,000 units in 2015 (PwC, 2016) with a ratio of 3:1 
between imported used vehicles and brand new vehicle sales. Furthermore, of the new vehicle sales only 
30% are purchased by the non-corporate segment i.e. individuals purchasing for private use. This is due 
to the very high import tariffs imposed on importation of fully built units totalling 75% of the initial 
purchase price. The country’s overall motor vehicle fleet is estimated at between 10 - 14 million units 
(Deloitte, 2016 and PwC, 2016), with at least 50% of the fleet aged over 12-years according to analysis 
by PwC. Despite minimal domestic production, the magnitude of Nigeria’s demographics indicate 
potential for a domestic automotive industry. However, this would have to start with production of low-
cost vehicles due to small per capita incomes, estimated at USD 2,646 in 2016 (World Bank, 2017).  
 
The government has taken steps to relaunch21 vehicle assembly in Nigeria with the development of the 
New Automotive Industry Development Plan (NAIDP), launched in 2014. The NAIDP has seen a 
number of tariff concessions introduced to encourage local assembly while increases in import tariffs 
have been imposed on fully built units22. Response to the NAIDP appears ambivalent with the licensing 
of up to 35 assembly companies in a relatively short period. This proliferation may indicate new entrants 
are simply pursuing licenses as a way of circumventing higher import duties on fully built units. Holders 
of assembly licenses are permitted a prescribed number of FBU imports at a preferential tariff as long as 
                                                 
20 A rebasing in 2015 of GDP catapulted Nigeria to the top spot surpassing South Africa, which had long held the position of 
the largest economy in Africa. However, a collapse in the global prices of oil which is Nigeria’s leading export, contributing 
over 95% of export revenue and making up 35% of GDP, has resulted in recession, a severe foreign exchange shortfall and 
contraction of the economy. 
21 Nigeria has previously engaged in assembly of motor vehicles with major OEM’s such as Volkswagen and Peugeot having 
established plants over 4 decades ago in the 1970’s. However, most of these plants have since ceased operations or are 
operating grossly under capacity due to the myriad economic challenges faced by the country in the interim period. 
22 Import tariffs on fully built units (used or brand new) are 75%, while for semi-knocked down kits (SKD) and completely 
knocked down kits (CKD) the rates are 10% and 0% respectively. 
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they commit to meet set assembly targets. Effective monitoring, and enforcement, of this condition may 
prove cumbersome and therefore not bring about the intended developmental outcomes. 
 
Further assessment of the industry’s performance in the wake of the NAIDP has been stifled by Nigeria’s 
on-going economic recession brought about by the collapse in oil prices over the past three years. This 
has led to severe foreign exchange shortages (Reuters, 2017), making it difficult for assemblers and 
component manufacturers to import much needed kits and parts. It thus remains unclear whether the 
Nigerian automotive sector is likely to attain viability in the short-term. However, assuming stabilisation 
of the economy in the medium-long term, followed by modest and steady economic growth, the sheer 
size of the market could provide economic justification for continued development of a domestic 
automotive sector. This would have to be underpinned by the right mix of industrial and trade policies to 
ensure meaningful upgrading takes place. In this regard, the prospects for a viable automotive space 





3.0 THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR IN KENYA 
 
This section will delve into the state of the automotive sector in Kenya. The discussion will assess the 
viability of the sector in light of its perpetual infant industry characteristics. The emerging motorcycle 
sub-sector will also be examined with a discussion on whether it exhibits prospects for faster 
development vis-à-vis the more technologically demanding automobile sector. To begin with, an 
assessment of industrialisation in Kenya is presented, alongside a discussion of recent economic 
performance.   
 
3.1 Overview of economic performance and industrialization in Kenya 
Kenya has had a longer history of industrial development relative to her regional neighbours alongside 
favourable industrial and trade policies (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). In 2015 GDP per capita was US$1,434 
with overall GDP estimated at US$ 63.40 billion (World Bank, 2016) placing the Kenyan economy as 
the largest within the EAC regional bloc. Kenya’s economic output constitutes 44% of the region’s 
combined GDP of US$ 144.32 billion (Table 3.0).  
 















Kenya 63.40 44 44.20 29 1,434 
Tanzania 45.63 32 47.68 31 957 
Uganda 24.31 17 39.89 26 609 
Rwanda 8.11 6 11.30 7 718 

















Attributes ascribed to Kenya’s regional economic leadership include, good financial infrastructure 
comprising a relatively stable banking system and the most advanced money and capital markets within 
the region (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). A skilled human resource base and good institutional regulatory 
frameworks (Chege, et al. 2014) serve to cement to the country’s leading economic role within the region. 
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Lastly, the country’s economic performance has also benefitted from relative political stability23 in a 
region that has had its fair share of civil unrest and political upheaval. 
Notwithstanding her leading role vis-à-vis regional peers, the growth rate of the Kenyan economy has 
been underwhelming over the past two decades. This is evident from figure 3.1, which shows the pace 
of GDP growth has been below the EAC average, and only surpasses Burundi, whose economy is 22 
times smaller and continues to be hamstrung by political discordance. 
Figure 3.1: East African Community average GDP growth rate 
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2016 
Notes: For Burundi, the growth series starts in 1997, while for Rwanda the series starts in 1998 to adjust for pre and post conflict oversized 
contraction and expansion. 
 
The slow pace of economic growth has hampered faster development of Kenya’s manufacturing sector. 
This is evident when using the United Nations Industrial Development Organisations’ (UNIDO) 
competitive industrial performance (CIP) index24 to assess her manufacturing capabilities. The CIP index 
places Kenya 113th globally; ahead of regional peers but significantly behind several emerging and 
industrialising economies (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Between 2008 and 2013, only one CIP indicator 
measuring the manufacturing sector’s performance registered an increase, albeit a modest one. 
                                                 
23 The major aberration being the post-election violence that erupted after the disputed 2007 presidential poll. 
24 The CIP index sets out to determine the long-run sustainable growth of a country’s manufacturing industry (UNIDO, 2015). 
It assesses manufacturing development and industrial competitiveness over time by looking at “the capacity of countries to 
increase their presence in international and domestic markets while developing industrial sectors and activities with higher 
value added and higher technological levels” (UNIDO, 2015). Essentially, the CIP index measures how countries have 
upgraded technological capabilities, expanded production capacity, improved infrastructure and adopted suitable policies to 
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Manufacturing value added (MVA) per capita increased marginally by 3% but this contrasts with 
decreases in the share of MVA in GDP and manufactured exports per capita, both of which fell by 9%. 
This is worrisome for Kenya’s industrialisation prospects and indeed, development of the auto sector. 
Government authorities have acknowledged the evident lack of growth in the country’s small industrial 
base. An example of this is contained in Kenya’s Industrial Transformation Programme (KITP), issued 
by the Ministry of Industrialization and Enterprise Development (GoK, 2015). It states; “the 
manufacturing sector experienced no growth over the period 2005-15 remaining stagnant at 11% of 
GDP”. 
Table 3.1: Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) and industrial competitiveness among EAC countries 
 
Country MVA per capita  
(constant 2005 US$) 
 
Share of MVA in GDP (%) Manufactured exports per 
capita (2013 US$) 
CIP Ranking 
2013 
 2008 2013 change 2008 2013 change 2008 2013 change  
Kenya 59 61 3% 11 10 -9% 59 58 -9% 113 
Tanzania 34 43 25% 8 9 13% 31 33 13% 121 
Uganda 24 27 13% 7 7 0% 15 17 0% 129 
Rwanda 21 22 3% 7 6 -14% 11 27 -14% 136 
Burundi 16 13 -18% 10 8 -20% 3 4 -20% 140 
           
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2015 
CIP = Competitive Industrial Performance 
 
Table 3.2: Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) and industrial competitiveness amongst selected 
emerging and developing economies 
Country MVA per capita 
(constant 2005 US$) 
 
Share of MVA in GDP (%) Manufactured exports per 




 2008 2013 change 2008 2013 change 2008 2013 change  
Malaysia 1617 1717 6% 26 25 -4% 5148 6202 20% 24 
Thailand 1080 1168 8% 36 34 -6% 2253 2999 33% 26 
Mauritius 982 1066 8% 16 15 -6% 1583 1469 -7% 82 
S. Africa 932 894 -4% 16 15 -6% 1017 1209 19% 41 
China 788 1143 45% 33 33 0% 1020 1540 51% 5 
Indonesia 380 451 19% 26 25 -4% 354 439 24 42 
Egypt 233 242 -4% 16 15 -6% 213 228 7% 71 
Vietnam 174 236 36% 22 23 5% 423.1 1129 167% 50 
Bangladesh 84 118 40% 17 19 12% 99 152 53% 77 
Kenya 59 61 3% 11 10 -9% 59 58 -9% 113 
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Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2015 
CIP = Competitive Industrial Performance 
 
 More poignantly, Were et al. (2017) observe that the share of manufacturing in gross domestic product 
was the same in 2015 as it was half a century ago in 1965 and declined to a low of 9.2% in the five years 
to 2016. This has had a negative impact on employment creation and has seen the share of formal sector 
manufacturing jobs follow a downward trend over the ten-year period 2005 – 2015, declining from 17% 
to 12% of total formal sector jobs. These trends are illustrated in the two charts in figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: Employment trends in the formal manufacturing sector 
 
   Source: Adapted from the 2016 Economic Survey published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
 
The formal sector in Kenya is relatively small in comparison to the informal sector that provides over 
80% of national employment. Table 3.3 highlights this and shows that despite an increase in the absolute 
number of formal sector jobs between 2005 - 2015, from 1.8 million to just under 2.5 million jobs, the 
informal sector expanded at a faster pace to constitute 84% of total employment in 2015 versus the formal 
sector’s 16%. 
 
Table 3.3: Formal sector employment vs informal sector employment 
 2005 2006 2010 2011 2014 2015 
Formal sector jobs 1 811 600 1 857 600 2 060 400 2 084 100 2 370 200 2 478 000 
Informal sector jobs 6 626 600 7 068 600 8 829 800 9 948 300 11 846 000 12 562 500 
Total jobs 8 438 200 8 926 200 10 890 200 12 032 400 14 216 200 15 040 500 
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Formal manufacturing jobs vs overall formal 
sector jobs











2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015




Informal sector jobs (%) 79% 79% 81% 83% 83% 84% 
 
Source: Extracted from annual economic surveys (2005 – 2016) published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
 
Taking cognisance of the informal sector’s dominant role in the economy, a closer look at informal sector 
manufacturing is warranted. Official statistics show a rapid expansion of informal sector manufacturing 
vis-à-vis stagnation of formal sector manufacturing. 
Figure 3.3: Employment trends formal vs informal sector 2005 – 2015 
  
Source: Compiled from statistics published in annual economic surveys (2005 – 2016), Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
 
The informal manufacturing sector which is referred to locally as Jua Kali, a Swahili term meaning ‘hot 
sun’ in reference to its outdoor work places, is considered innovative and resilient given the operating 
constraints most enterprises in the sector face (Daniels, 2010). Figure 3.3 provides some insight into the 
sector’s resilience showing that the sector weathered the brunt of the global financial crisis and also 
emerged relatively unscathed from the post-election violence25 that plagued the country in early 2008. 
Constraints affecting informal sector manufacturing include; a lack of access to affordable bank credit, 
unavailability of formal skills training programmes and a lack of business support platforms (Daniels, 
2010). The sector engages mostly in small-scale manufacture of furniture and fabrication of assorted 
metal products including basic farm implements, and simple spare parts for the auto sector. Artisans who 
work in the sector are typically self-trained or have undergone an apprenticeship within their place of 
                                                 
25 Kenya suffered nationwide politically induced violence in early 2008 following a disputed presidential poll in December 
2007. This resulted in an impasse that lasted several months, claiming the lives of over 1,000 people. The impact to the 
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formal vs informal sector 2005 - 2016
Formal sector manufacturing jobs
Informal sector manufacturing jobs
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work. Informal manufacturing is estimated to account for over a third of the 6.7 million informal sector 
jobs in 2015 (KNBS, 2016). 
 
Productivity in the informal sector is well below that of the formal sector, but for certain categories of 
goods, Kenya’s informal sector produces goods that are highly price competitive. Were (2016a) 
highlights these as basic gardening and farming implements, and basic auto components such as exhaust 
pipes. Quality considerations are often overlooked by consumers who seek a trade-off between 
affordability versus durability. 
 
The dynamism exhibited by informal manufacturing in Kenya adds credence to the argument presented 
by McMillan (2014) on where to focus when assessing the apparent lack of progression in manufacturing 
in SSA. McMillan argues that most analyses focuses on formal sector manufacturing that as per Kenya’s 
example is either stagnant of declining. Instead, focus ought to be placed on manufacturing activity in 
the informal sector, which in Kenya’s instance generated close to 1.3 million new jobs between 1990-
2007 (McMillan, KNBS 2014). Stronger linkages between informal sector manufacturing and formal 
sector manufacturing have been proposed as one of the channels towards upgrading productivity and 
increasing the share of overall output from manufacturing in SSA. 
 
The question as it pertains to the automotive sector in Kenya is whether there exists a need to direct 
resources towards the lesser complex parts of the sector which are more suited to informal manufacturing 
such as fabrication of basic components. Skills and capabilities could then be upgraded progressively 
over time. Indeed, the literature on global automotive value chains highlights the importance of 
specialisation as an important step towards value chain integration.  
 
3.2 Automobile assembly in Kenya 
Commercial assembly of motor vehicles in Kenya commenced in earnest in the mid 1970’s (Murage, 
1983). In a relatively short span of time, five assembly plants were launched in line with government 
policies encouraging import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Indeed, the government held significant 






























1982 - 51% 
2017 - 20% 
Nairobi 
1) Isuzu trucks 
2) Isuzu pickups 
3) Bedford trucks 
1) Isuzu trucks 








1982 - 51% 
2017 - 0% 
 
Mombasa 
1) Datsun pickups 
2) Nissan minibus 
3) Mercedes trucks 
4) Toyota pickups 
5) Hino trucks 
6) Mazda pickups 
7) Ford trucks 
8) Peugeot pickups  
9) Daihatsu pickups 
1) Toyota pickups 
2) Fuso trucks 
3) Hino trucks 
4) Tata trucks 
5) Tata buses 
6) Scania trucks 
7) Scania buses 
8) Mitsubishi 
    trucks 
 








1982 - 35% 
2017 - 35% 
Thika 
1) Leyland buses 
2) Leyland trucks 
3) Land rovers 
4) Nissan trucks 
5) Nissan buses 
6) VW Microbus 
7) Mitsubishi pickups 
8) Fuso trucks 
9) Suzuki vans 
1) VW hatchback 
2) Bus bodies 
3) Mobius SUV 







1) Fiat Trucks 








1) Mack trucks 
Defunct 120 Defunct 
      21 180 32 600 
Source: Company websites, Murage (1983), Okatch, Mukulu & Oyugi (2011) 
Associated Vehicle Assemblers and Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers have operated as contract assemblers since inception, while 
General Motors East Africa has only produced Isuzu vehicles since inception. 
 
Despite the rather promising start, the industry’s fortunes over the decades have been mixed with the 
industry seemingly unable to move beyond first gear. Two of the five plants ceased operations in the 
1980’s. The three plants still in operation grapple with capacity underutilisation of approximately 30% 
on average. It is also interesting to note that as of 1982 a proliferation of marques and models were 
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assembled by the various plants, mostly through contract assembly arrangements (Murage, 1983). 
Government policies at the time seemed to encourage this proliferation via a mixture of tariff concessions 
for imported assembly kits, high tariffs for importation of fully built units and priority foreign exchange 
allocations for the assembly sector during a period of foreign exchange control (Okatch et al., 2011). 
 
A significant amount of rationalisation has occurred over the decades within the three assembly plants 
still in operation. This is evident in the reduced number of marques and models assembled. Nonetheless, 
capacity underutilisation across all three plants remains cause for concern. Another shortcoming is the 
lack of proximity of the plants to each other (Table 3.5) which is unlikely to encourage the development 
of auto component manufacturing clusters, especially given the small size of the market. The lack of a 
substantive components supplier base presents a continuing challenge for achievement of the government 
set local content threshold of 30%. The threshold is attached to the tariff concessions available to 
assemblers on importation of SKD kits (see Table 3.6). However, the local content rule is often 
challenged by assemblers who make a case for inclusion of the contribution of local labour in assessing 
compliance. This indicates the threshold is unlikely to be met solely from locally sourced components, 
especially considering that monitoring compliance appears weak. 
 











Mombasa  port 
GMEA Nairobi 441km - 40km 474km 
AVA Mombasa - 441km 521km 7km 
KVM Thika 521km 40km - 524km 
Source: Respective company websites, Deloitte Africa (2016), KMI 





Table 3.6: Import tariff rates applicable on FBU vs SKD imports 






Import duty 25% of customs value* 
 
  nil nil 
Excise duty 20% of (customs value + import duty) 
 
  nil nil 
Value added tax 16% of (customs value + import duty +excise 
duty) 
 
  nil   
Import declaration 
fee 
2% of customs value 
 
    nil 
Railway 
development levy 
1.5% of customs value 
 
    nil 
Source: Kenya Revenue Authority website – www.kra.go.ke, Deloitte Africa (2016) 
 
* customs value = current retail selling price (CRSP) less depreciation based on age of vehicle. The CRSP is determined by 
Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and published on the KRA website at the start of the government fiscal year on 1st July 
** Value added tax (VAT) on locally assembled FBU’s is levied on the ex-factory price. 
 
Following the brief history of the sector, we now turn to the present. The total automobile fleet in Kenya 
was estimated at 1.3 million units in 2014 (Deloitte Africa, 2016). The national fleet has grown rapidly 
in recent years according to statistics published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), 
which reveal 445,099 new motor vehicle registrations26 during the 5-year period 2011-15 (Table 3.7). 
Although this shows how small the market is by global standards, it still reveals that the entire fleet 
increased by approximately 30% over a relatively short period. This would bode well for the automobile 
assembly sector if supply for new registrations came primarily from local assembly plants. However, this 
is not the case. 
 
Table 3.7: New registrations of motor vehicles in Kenya 2011 – 2015 
Type of Vehicle 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Totals 
Saloon Cars 11 026 12 985 16 343 15 902 14 369  
Station Wagons* 31 199 39 862 48 662 53 542 54 120  
Total Passenger Vehicles 42 225 52 847 65 005 69 444 68 489 298 010 
Panel Vans, Pick-ups, etc. 7 442 7 945 9 819 12 568 13 878  
Lorries/ Trucks 5 247 7 821 9 570 10 681 13 785  
Buses and Coaches 1 662 1 638 2 062 2 210 2 342  
Mini Buses 451 78 235 213 581  
Trailers 2 556 3 761 3 973 2 925 3 905  
Total Commercial Vehicles 17 358 21 243 25 659 28 597 34 491 127 348 
                                                 
26 New registrations refer to all first time registrations. Imported used cars count towards new registrations upon entry into 
Kenya with no distinction made between brand new locally assembled and brand new imported vehicles in registration data. 
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Wheeled Tractors 1 179 1 386 1 902 2 032 2 259  
Other Vehicles 2 724 1 753 1 451 2 533 2 522  
Total Motor Vehicles 63 486 77 229 94 017 102 606 107 761 445 099 
% Passenger Vehicles 67% 68% 69% 68% 64% 67% 
% Commercial Vehicles 27% 28% 27% 28% 32% 29% 
% Other 6% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2016) 
*Station wagons represent hatchbacks as well as SUVs (sport utility vehicles) both of which fall within the passenger 
vehicles category alongside saloon cars.   
 
According to the automobile sector’s main representative body, the Kenya Motor Industry Association 
(KMI)27, there were sales of 19,523 new28 vehicles by local car dealerships in 2015, which was a record 
high sales year29. This falls within the overall number of 107,761 vehicles registered in 2015 (both brand 
new and imported). Brand new vehicles thus constituted only 18% of new registrations with the 
remainder, i.e. over 80%, comprising imports of used vehicles. Furthermore, not all sales of brand new 
vehicles originated from local assembly plants. The local industry supplied only 9,385 vehicles with the 
balance of 10,138 vehicles (52%) comprising imports sold through authorised OEM distributors. With 
imports of both used and brand new vehicles making up over 90% of new vehicle registrations in 2015 
(figure 3.4), which is in line with the trend of recent years, a scenario emerges where the automobile 
assembly sector is a marginal player in supplying the local market. 
 
Figure 3.4: Sources of new vehicle registrations in Kenya in 2015 
 
 
                                                 
27 Established in 1989, the KMI is the pre-eminent forum for the automotive industry in Kenya and positions itself as the 
pivotal link between the industry, government and the public at large. 
28New here refers to brand new vehicles that were either assembled locally or imported from an Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) based overseas. 
29 This compares to just under 10,000 brand new vehicles sold in 2005 indicating that it has taken a decade to double sales 













Source: Authors compilation using data from the 2016 Economic Survey published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(KNBS), Deloitte Africa Automotive Insights (2016). 
 
Furthermore, local assembly plants have performed grossly under capacity over the years (Table 3.8). 
This could indicate challenges with competitiveness especially against imports (used and new) or could 
be a reflection of the paucity of attributes necessary for the sector to flourish. As mentioned previously, 
the automotive industry requires the alignment of several aspects including; skills development, 
appropriate policies, patient capital, consumer finance and the availability of an automotive space (scale 
and supply chain). 
 














GMEA 7 000 2 629 38% 16 000 5 347 33% 
AVA* 
 
  10 000 4 206 42% 
KVM 6 600 1 108 17% 6 600 202 3% 
 13 600 3 737 27% 32 600 9 717 30% 
 
Source: Company websites, Deloitte Africa (2016), KMI, Okatch, Mukulu & Oyugi (2011) 
* The author was unable to locate production and capacity figures for AVA for 2007 
GMEA – General Motors East Africa 
AVA – Associated Vehicle Assemblers 
KVM – Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers 
 
It is also important to note that over 95% of domestic production comprises light commercial vehicles 
(LCVs) i.e. light-duty trucks30 and mini-buses31, with virtually no production of passenger vehicles. This 
aspect has long dominated the industry as locally assembled commercial vehicles have an edge over 
imported ones mostly due to price considerations32. Production of saloon cars was abandoned by the 
industry due to high operating costs,33 alongside the proliferation of imports of ‘affordable’ used cars. 
As CIF34 prices declined over the past two decades, the landed cost of imported used passenger vehicles, 
                                                 
30 Not exceeding load carrying capacity of 10-tonnes. 
31 Not exceeding passenger carrying capacity of 60 persons. 
32 The price advantage arises due to freight costs, as it is cheaper to ship LCV vehicles in parts (for assembly) than fully built. 
33 Mentioned as electricity tariffs, disproportionally high labour costs for scarce skilled workers, and a host of business 
environment inefficiencies including expensive credit and several nuisance taxes and levies. 
34 Cost, insurance and freight, which is basically the cost incurred up until the destination port (Mombasa in Kenya). It 




after factoring in payment of import duties and associated customs charges, sunk to as low as USD 5,000 
for basic entry-level models. Comparable locally assembled vehicles were on the market for USD 25,000. 
 
Local assembly of commercial vehicles35 has not been significantly affected by used vehicle imports. 
Due to their larger size, importation of FBU buses and trucks attracts higher freight charges on a per unit 
volume basis. This means the 25% import tariff concession differential favours importation of 
commercial vehicle SKD kits and enables domestic assemblers to deliver a competitively priced product 
to the market. Additionally, public service commuter vehicles have provided a lifeline to the auto 
assembly sector over the past couple of decades. The ubiquitously colourful, noisy and aggressively 
driven Matatus’36, the 25 to 33-seater mini-buses that form the backbone of the urban public transport 
system, have been a source of steady demand for domestic assemblers. The Matatu industry has also 
provided steady demand for local firms involved in coach building, body artwork and basic metal 
fabrication in both the formal and informal sector. 
 
Notwithstanding the relative success assemblers have had with commercial vehicles, policy 
unpredictability has hampered the pace of growth. For instance, the unexpected introduction of excise 
duty on domestically assembled vehicles in the 2016 government fiscal year37 unsettled the industry. 
This was further exacerbated in the 2017 fiscal year38 by additional changes involving the transition from 
a specific excise duty structure to one based on ad valorem rates which further increased the price of 
domestically assembled vehicles. Hitherto, excise duty was levied only on imported vehicles (both used 
and new). The introduction of excise duty followed the introduction of value added tax on domestically 
assembled vehicles in 2013 (Juma, 2016) and thus effectively eliminated the tariff concessions previously 
available on imported SKD kits. The consequence of the excise duty changes was a 29% drop in sales 
for the first six-months of 2016 (Juma, 2016) and led to job losses. Realising this adverse impact, the 
government reversed imposition of excise duty towards the end of 2016. However, the damage was 
already done and confidence in policy predictability among industry players remains low. 
 
                                                 
35 Comprising light to medium sized commercial vehicles 
36 The origins of the name Matatu are rumoured to have originated from the initial fare charged by the mini-buses when they 
first surfaced on Kenyan roads in the 1970’s. The fare was Kshs 3/= on most routes. Three in Swahili is tatu with the ma 
prefix added to denote ‘the’ i.e. the 3’s. 
37 Commencing 1st July 2015 
38 Commencing 1st July 2016 
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3.2.1 General Motors East Africa (now Isuzu East Africa)39 
General Motors East Africa (GMEA) is one of the two assembly plants the author visited during a field 
trip to Nairobi, Kenya in February 2017. The GMEA plant established in 1975 marked the American 
automaker, General Motors’ (GM), first production presence in the east African region. The plant was 
initially set up as a joint venture (JV) with the Government of Kenya (GoK) to assemble heavy and light 
commercial vehicles i.e. trucks, buses and pick-ups (Murage, 1983). Assembly operations commenced 
in 1977 at a site within the industrial area in Nairobi. At inception, the GoK held a majority 51% stake 
to GM’s 49% (GMEA, 2017). This initial shareholding arrangement points to the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) policies pursued at the time where direct government stakes in major industrial 
enterprises was viewed as a necessary channel for government support and control (Chege et al., 2014). 
However, by 1997 GM’s shareholding in GMEA had increased to 57.7% while the GoK’s shareholding 
had decreased to 20% an indicator of the abandonment of ISI policies towards the end of the 1980’s. 
Two private sector entities had become shareholders by 1997 namely, Centum40 – a locally publicly listed 
investment company and Itochu, a large Japanese trading company and holder of franchise rights for the 
Isuzu brand, GMEA’s main offering. 
 
Table 3.9: GMEA shareholding through the years 
 1975 1997 2017 
GM* 49,0% 57,7% nil 
GoK 51,0% 20,0% 20,0% 
Centum nil 17,8% 17,8% 
Itochu nil 4,5% 4,5% 
Isuzu* nil nil 57,7% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source: GMEA (2017), The East African (2017) *GM announced in February 2017 plans to sale its entire stake to Isuzu 
 
The GMEA plant has the largest installed capacity in the sector with the ability to produce up to 16,000 
vehicles per annum. Notwithstanding this, capacity utilisation remains low, standing at 33% in 2015. 
This compares to 66% utilisation three decades ago (table 3.10). Production numbers show 2015 as a 
record year with 5,347 units produced, although busier plants in other markets on the continent such as 
South Africa and Morocco achieve this output in a matter of weeks. In 2016, another milestone was 
                                                 
39 General Motors announced plans to sell its entire stake in the GMEA assembly plant to Isuzu Motors in February 2017. 
This follows a global realignment of GM’s strategic focus, which has seen withdrawals from several markets in Asia, Africa 
and Europe. 
40 Centum is listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange and holds stakes in a diversified portfolio ranging from banking, fast 
moving consumer goods, real estate, energy and manufacturing. 
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marked – total production since inception in 1977 reached 80,000 units. Although these milestones are 
significant for the plant, they demonstrate how much further the industry still has to go. Assuming fairly 
even production throughout the plant’s forty-year history, the average annual production works out to 
2,000 units per annum. In terms of economies of scale, viewpoints by various experts indicate production 
quantities ranging between 150,000 to 300,000 units per annum as being necessary to achieve minimum 
efficient scale in vehicle assembly. Black (2007) discusses these viewpoints and finds that while there is 
no universal consensus, the possibility of achieving success at the lower end of the range, i.e. 150,000 
units, is likely if newer production technologies are employed or in the luxury and specialty vehicle 
segment (where profit margins are likely to be higher). With this in mind, one begins to get a sense of 
just how far the Kenyan industry has to go, or more poignantly, question whether the industry really has 
sustainable commercial viability. 
 
Table 3.10: GMEA capacity utilisation and employment 1981 vs 2015 
 1981 2015 Change 
Annual production Capacity 4 300 16 000 3.72x 
Actual production 2 830 5 347 1.89x 
Capacity utilisation 66% 33% (2) x 
Employees 358* 454 1.26x 
 
Source: GMEA (2017), Murage (1983). * as of 1982 
 
GMEA operates as both a franchise importer and assembler, holding the franchise rights to GM’s 
Chevrolet brand and the Japanese brand Isuzu (figure 3.5 shows a full list of GMEA’s product range). 
Chevrolet vehicles are imported fully built and constitute a minor share of GMEA’s overall sales. The 
majority of GMEA’s sales, over 90%, are commercial vehicles under the Isuzu brand, assembled using 
imported SKD kits. The range includes light-duty and medium-duty trucks, and buses with seating 
capacities ranging from 26 – 51 passengers. Unlike the other two assemblers in the market, GMEA does 







Source: GMEA Company Presentation (February 2017) * The Chevrolet brand has since been withdrawn from the East African market.  
 
According to company officials, Isuzu pick-up trucks were previously assembled at the plant but are now 
imported fully built from GM’s factory in South Africa. This change appears to have been predicated on 
ensuring price competitiveness in the market, indicating the tariff concessions on imports of SKD kits 
are not enough to justify domestic assembly in the face of high operational costs. As with passenger 
vehicles, if the landed price of imported FBU pick-ups proves more competitive, continuation of 
domestic assembly proves untenable. 
 
GMEA’s operations focus on assembling major parts and components contained in SKD kits imported 
from GM and Isuzu affiliated production facilities overseas. The SKD kits contain major parts including 
engines, transmission systems and electronic components with assembly operations entailing mounting 
of the engine and transmission system onto the chassis, wiring, welding of body parts and painting. 
Despite the mandatory local content threshold of 30%, it was difficult to ascertain the exact ratio of local 
inputs that go into production. According to company officials, local inputs comprise wiring harnesses, 
exhaust systems, batteries, tyres, seats upholstery and in the case of mini-buses vehicle bodies. GMEA 
works alongside a number of local suppliers and in some instances assists with supplier development. 
Notwithstanding this, the domestic auto components sector faces several operational and business 
environment constraints. Instances where component suppliers are assemblers or simply importers of 
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GMEA’s long-standing supplier of tyres, Sameer-Africa, whose factory ceased domestic production in 
2016 due to intense competition from cheaper priced imports. To counter this, Sameer-Africa resolved 
to shut down its factory, located in very close proximity to GMEA’s plant, and outsource production to 
suppliers in China and India effectively becoming an importer and distributor of tyres. Taking cognisance 
of such challenges and trends could explain the government’s not too rigid compliance monitoring. 
 
Post the author’s field visit to the GMEA plant in February 2017, GM signalled its exit from the East 
African market by announcing the sale of its entire 57.7% stake in GMEA to Isuzu Motors (Muchira, 
2017). In addition to disposing its assembly operations, GM also announced plans to stop selling its 
Chevrolet brand of vehicles in the region. This could be seen as an indictment on the future prospects for 
the industry and the broader East African market, although GM’s withdrawal was prompted by a wider 
restructuring and rationalisation of global operations. In May 2017, GM made a similar announcement 
with regards to its operations in South Africa, announcing plans to sale its manufacturing plant to Isuzu 
Motors (Bowker, 2017). GM’s exit from Africa follows similar announcements to either withdraw or 
scale back operations in other parts of the world including Europe, India, Russia, Thailand and Indonesia. 
GM’s retreat from markets it views as not having a competitive edge in, and reorienting focus on core 
markets in North America, is yet another indication of how competitive and challenging the global auto 
industry has become. This is particularly so in light of disruptive developments taking place in the global 
industry where established and emerging automakers battle for market share in the next frontier of 
automotive technologies comprising electric vehicles and driver-less cars.  This is likely to result in the 
obsolescence of the long-standing internal combustion engine in the decades to come. 
 
3.2.2 Associated Vehicle Assemblers  
Established in 1977 Associated Vehicle Assemblers (AVA) has operated as a contract assembler 
throughout its history. AVA is strategically located in Kenya’s main port city of Mombasa, unlike the 
other two auto plants located approximately 500 kilometres in the hinterland. AVA produces no less than 
six brands, which is slightly less than the 10 brands produced in 1982. The number of models produced 
has also declined from 35 in 1982 (Murage, 1983) to 27 currently (AVA, 2017). AVA appears to be the 
most productive plant in the industry41 having produced 145,000 vehicles since inception in 1977 
according to company records. This compares to GMEA’s overall production of 80,000 vehicles as of 
2016 and KVM’s overall production of 60,000 as of 2015. However, it is interesting to note that average 
                                                 
41 AVA’s installed capacity is 10,000 units per annum compared to GMEA’s 16,000 and KVM’s 6,000 units. 
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annual production in the five years to 2016 was below the level achieved in 1982 of 5,528 vehicles (Table 
3.11).  
 
Table 3.11: AVA capacity utilisation and employment 1981 vs 2015 
 1982  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Production Capacity 11 180  10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Actual production 5 528  2 304 3 259 4 528 4 206 3 075 
Capacity utilisation 49%  23% 33% 45% 42% 30% 
Employees 572  * * * * 330 
 
Source: GMEA (2017), Murage (1983). * author was unable to establish employment numbers for these years 
 
Table 3.12: AVA – marques and number of models per vehicle type (1982 vs 2017) 
 1982  2017 
 
 Buses Trucks Pickups 
 
Buses Trucks Pickups 
Daihatsu   3     
Datsun   8     
Ford  5      
Fuso (India)      3  
Fuso (Japan)      6  
Hino  1    3  
Mazda   2     
Mercedes  4      
Nissan 3       
Peugeot   3     
Scania     4 6  
Tata     1 2  
Toyota  1 3    2 
Volvo  2      
Total 3 13 19  5 20 2 
All models 35   27  
 
Source: AVA (2017), Murage (1983) 
 
AVA is the only plant amongst the three auto assemblers that no longer has government shareholding. 
Ownership of the plant is currently held equally between two large local dealerships both of whom are 





Table 3.13: AVA shareholding 1977 vs 2017 
 1977 2017 
GoK/ Industrial Development Bank 51,0% nil 
Lonrho Kenya Ltd 24.5% nil 
Inchape Ltd 24.5% nil 
Simba Corporation Ltd nil 50% 
Marshalls (E.A.) Ltd nil 50% 
 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Source: AVA (2017), Murage (1983) 
*Industrial Development Bank was ultimately owned by the Government of Kenya (GoK) through a number of affiliates. The 51% stake 
was split as follows; 26% - GoK, 25% - Industrial Development Bank. 
 
The author did not visit the AVA plant during the field trip42 but according to information provided by 
the company onsite facilities at AVA include a body shop, jig shop, paint shop and a maintenance 
workshop. Use of local components appears minimal with only four local suppliers enlisted to supply 
batteries and tyres. Despite not visiting the plant, the author had an opportunity to meet with a senior 
executive of one of AVA’s shareholders43 in Nairobi in February 2017. During discussions, a key concern 
highlighted was the inconsistency and unpredictability of government policy in recent years exacerbated 
by minimal and uncoordinated consultation with sector stakeholders. A case in point was the unexpected 
introduction of excise duty on domestically assembled vehicles (as mentioned earlier). Another concern 
was the perception of an uneven playing field following the government’s granting of tariff concessions 
applicable on SKD assembly to VW’s new assembly venture at rival assembler Kenya Vehicle 
Manufacturers (KVM). The venture which commenced towards the end of 2016 involves minimal 
assembly of the Polo Vivo hatchback which is imported almost fully assembled from VW’s plant in 
South Africa (see figure 3.6). Despite minimal value addition, and ambiguity around commitments to 
expand to proper assembly, the venture enjoys the full set of SKD tariff concessions i.e. a 45% differential 
vis-à-vis imports of FBUs. Speculation around this seemingly biased preferential treatment range from 
efforts by government to prop up flagging operations at KVM, where it still has shareholding, to a bid to 
revive of domestic assembly of passenger vehicles. 
 
3.2.3 Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers 
Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers (KVM) commenced operation in 1976 and is the only plant where the 
government continues to have a larger ownership stake vis-à-vis its joint venture partners. The current 
                                                 
42 AVA’s plant is located in Mombasa, while the author’s field visit was limited to Nairobi, the capital city. 
43 Simba Corporation Ltd 
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joint venture partners are two large domestic dealerships, DT Dobie Ltd. and CMC Holdings Ltd. The 
two hold distributorship franchises for major global automakers and have been part of the domestic 
automotive scene for decades, both tracing histories that pre-date Kenya’s independence. CMC Holdings 
traded as a publicly listed entity for 58 years before delisting from the Nairobi Stock Exchange in 2014 
upon acquisition by Al-Futtaim Automotive Group of the United Arab Emirates (CMC Holdings, 2017). 
DT Dobie on the other hand operated as a family owned business until its acquisition by the French 
CFAO automotive group in 2000.  Toyota Tsusho of Japan subsequently started an acquisition process 
for CFAO in 2012 that culminated in full ownership in 2016 (Toyota Tsusho, 2016).  
 
Table 3.14: KVM shareholding [past & present] 
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 100,0% 100,0% 
  
Source: Respective websites – KVM, CMC Holdings and DT Dobie 
 
Table 3.15: KVM capacity utilisation 1981 vs 2015 
 1982  2015 
Production Capacity 4 200  6 600 
Actual production 2 800  202 
Capacity utilisation 67%  3% 
 
Source: Deloitte (2016), Murage (1983).  
 
Table 3.16: KVM – marques and number of models per vehicle type (past & present) 
  1982  2015 - 2017  
 






Buses Trucks SUVs Hatchbacks 
Ashok Leyland          
Coach building*      1    
Eicher       1   
Hyundai       1   
52 
 
Hino       1   
Land Rover   7 7      
Leyland 5 6        
MAN          
Mitsubishi  2 1       
Mobius        1  
Nissan 1 2        
Suzuki 1 3        
Volkswagen 1        1 
          
Total 8 13 8 7  1 3 1 1 
All models 36  6 
 
Source: KVM (2017), Murage (1983), Mobius Motors (2016), Volkswagen (2016) 
* KVM provides bus coach building services not tied to any particular marque/ brand 
 
The two automotive trading groups behind KVM’s private shareholders hold between them franchises 
for several global brands. Prima facie, such links would appear to be an excellent opportunity for KVM’s 
assembly prospects. However, KVM’s existence is unlikely to have been a deciding factor during the 
acquisition processes of the parent companies of KVM’s private shareholders. Al-Futtaim’s acquisition 
of CMC Holdings delivered an established platform comprising a national network of showrooms, 
service centres and experienced personnel. The opportunity therefore to use this platform to distribute 
some of its brands in the future was more likely the overriding deciding factor in the investment. While 
in DT Dobie’s case, Toyota Tsusho’s acquisition of CFAO brought about immediate presence in 34 
African countries. Hence, KVM’s coincidental links to two global automotive trading groups arises out 
of its status as a legacy investment for both its former independent shareholders. Furthermore, the KVM 
plant is the most underutilised of the three auto plants with capacity utilisation a paltry 3% in 2015. Two 
recent developments that may have signalled a brighter future for KVM and the sector at large have 
ultimately proved illusionary than course altering. 
 
The first was the commencement of assembly at KVM of the first commercially produced Kenyan car 
brand, the Mobius II. Mobius Motors developed and designed the Mobius II in 2014 building it as an 
off-road car in the mould of a mid-sized sports utility vehicle with no-frills and a rugged build (Mobius 
Motors, 2016). It was touted as the ‘Car for Africa’ due to its basic but rugged design aimed at providing 
a solution fit for the poor road infrastructure across most of SSA, particularly in rural areas. Its initial 
retail price of US$10,000 was meant to be a draw for consumers in Kenya and the region. Although this 
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price point was substantially lower than most brand new passenger vehicles in the domestic market, it 
was still twice the landed cost of a basic entry-level imported used passenger car. The initial production 
run of 50 vehicles in 2014 took place at KVM. However, Mobius Motors has yet to commission another 
production run since. A visit by the author to Mobius Motors corporate office and show room in February 
2017 revealed that design modifications aimed at upgrading the vehicle were ongoing. No definite launch 
date was indicated and it is unclear when, if at all, Mobius Motors will return to KVM to commission 
further production runs. A number of reasons may explain this. Company officials were guarded as to 
how the initial model performed and whether all 50 units produced were fully taken up by the market. 
However, given the price point it is difficult to envision strong demand for future models, unless Mobius 
II’s successor is made available at a significantly reduced price to compete effectively against used 
imports. On the production side, it would be a challenge to achieve any scale efficiencies with such low 
numbers yet production runs in the thousands would probably be required to lower costs and hence 
increase affordability. The case of Mobius Motors best encapsulates the challenges of developing 
national auto brands in a developing country where the necessary automotive space is lacking and 
consumers have limited purchasing power. 
 
The second development was the announcement by Volkswagen South Africa (VWSA) in September 
2016 of plans to commence assembly of the Polo Vivo hatchback at the KVM plant – the first locally 
assembled passenger vehicle in over a decade. Production started in December 2016, with an initial 
annual production target of 5,000 vehicles set for 2017 (Daily Nation, 2016; VWSA, 2016). At first 
glance, this would seem a boon for KVM as opportunities for significant technology upgrading and much 
needed skills development could be expected. However, a field visit to KVM in February 2017 revealed 
otherwise. The VW Polo assembly operation entailed very minimal and basic assembly not worthy of 
the description SKD assembly. The vehicles appear to have been fully built in South Africa before being 
disassembled for export. The disassembled units are airfreighted to Kenya in large wooden crates 
comprising a complete cabin with only the engine, tyres and front and rear bumpers detached from the 
body (figure 3.6). Re-assembling the vehicle occurs in a matter of hours and involves very few personnel 
using the most basic of tools. Indeed, the vehicles arrive already painted with considerable care taken to 
ensure the paintwork is not damaged in transit due to the lack of a paint shop at the plant capable of 
international-standard work. In this context, the assembly operation seems to have been set up solely to 
take advantage of the tariff concessions applicable on importation of SKD kits rather than one entailing 
comprehensive upgrading and value addition. Furthermore, it demonstrates the ambiguity in rules 
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guiding domestic auto assembly with the VW operation at KVM viewed by other industry players as 
receiving preferential treatment. With less than 50 VW Polos’ produced as of February 2017, the full-
year production target of 5,000 units seems unlikely. 
 
A further observation during the visit to KVM was the dilapidated state of the entire assembly facility. It 
became apparent during discussions with a senior company executive that shareholder support was sorely 
lacking in terms of both financial and strategic input. The parlous nature of the operation had led to 
management resorting to enterprising ways to shore up revenues and supplement staff incomes. A 
furniture production operation had been set up in a section of the compound where the wooden crates 
used to freight the VW Polos are recycled to produce an assortment of furniture (figures 3.7 & 3.8). 
 
Figure 3.6 – VW Polo Vivo assembly kit prior to assembly at Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers assembly 
plant in Thika, Kenya – February 2017. 
 





Figure 3.7 – Furniture production yard within Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers compound. Furniture 
crafted out of recycled wood from crates used to freight the VW Polo – February 2017 
 
Source: Authors own photographic images obtained with consent of plant officials (2017).  
 
Figure 3.8 – recycled wood from crates used to freight the VW Polo Vivo – February 2017 
 





The observations made at KVM further illustrate the challenges of developing and sustainably operating 
comprehensive auto assembly operations in a small market that may nonetheless be exhibiting early 
prospects for growth in the medium to longer term. Given uncertainty around the pace and magnitude of 
the market’s growth, major automakers would prefer to strategically position themselves in the market 
without committing significant resources. The ‘locally assembled’ VW Polo Vivo retails for just under 
USD 17,000, which places it as one of the more affordable new passenger vehicles in its category but 
still beyond the reach of most Kenyan consumers. Furthermore, its retail price is mostly due to the tariff 
concession applied to the SKD kits that would otherwise not apply were the car imported fully built. The 
VW Polo may capture a very small portion of the new passenger vehicle market. Sales could receive a 
further boost should the government make good its commitment to accord preference to locally 
assembled vehicles when upgrading its fleet (Business Daily Africa, 2016). However, the main 
beneficiary out of this arrangement is undoubtedly VW South Africa who have gained preferential access 
to a market dominated by used car imports and where assembly of passenger vehicles was previously 
non-existent. 
 
3.3 Regional market 
As described in the previous section, the progressive growth in demand for automobiles in Kenya is 
evident, notwithstanding the relatively small size of the market. A 2016 report44 by the consulting firm 
Deloitte analysed the growth prospects of the auto industry in Africa. The report estimates that the 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of vehicle use in Kenya was 7.6% between 2005 and 2014, 
comprising both new and imported used vehicles. In value terms Kenya’s automotive trade deficit 
accounted for 40% of the East African Community’s (EAC)45 automotive trade deficit in 2013, using 
statistics available from UN Comtrade. None of the other countries in the EAC have vehicle assembly 
operations of note or that span the length of time of Kenya’s industry (Okatch et al, 2011). However, 
Kenya’s neighbour to the north, Ethiopia, is the only other country within the broader eastern Africa 
region that is actively promoting development of a domestic auto assembly industry, albeit under heavy 
tariff and non-tariff protection (Blair and Stamp, 2016; Deloitte, 2016). Similar to countries across the 
region Ethiopia also suffers an automotive trade deficit. Table 3.17 illustrates the extent of the automotive 
                                                 
44 Deloitte Africa Automotive Insights 
45 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda  
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trade deficit for Kenya, the EAC as a region and the EAC and Ethiopia jointly for the year 2013, the 
latest period for which figures are available.  
 
Table 3.17: Value of Imports versus Exports of Passenger Motor Vehicles in 2013 (USD millions) 
 
Kenya                     EAC                    EAC &  
(including Kenya)         Ethiopia 
 














Commercial Vehicle Imports – HS 87.04  211 619 1 382 
Commercial Vehicle Exports – HS 87.04 
 
16 60 63 
Bus Imports – HS87.02 








Tractor Imports – HS87.01 








    
Motorcycle Imports – HS87.11  96 264 296 
Motorcycle Exports – HS87.11 
  
1 9 9 
Kits Imports – HS87.06 & HS87.07 6 9 12 





Vehicle Parts Imports – HS87.08 80 164 271 







Motorcycle and Bike Parts Imports – HS87.14 5 42 52 
Motorcycle and Bike Parts Exports – HS87.14 0 2 2 
Net Automotive Trade Balance -1 125 -2 782 -4 322 
Source: UN Comtrade, 2013 
New and used passenger vehicles ҂ 
 
With an overall automotive trade deficit of US$ 2.8 billion across the EAC and US$ 4.3 billion when 
Ethiopia is included, a credible case could be made in favour of a collective regional approach towards 
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developing and harnessing the automotive space in the region. It is also instructive to note that the 
region’s automotive trade deficit of US$ 4.3 billion accounts for a quarter of SSA’s overall automotive 
trade deficit of US$ 16.3 billion (Black and McLennan, 2015). However, a joint regional automotive 
sector development strategy seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, even within the EAC, given 
challenges member countries have had enhancing regional trade of more basic commodities. (Mathieson, 
2016; Cooksey, 2016)46. Ethiopia on the other hand, has a history of heavy economic protectionism and 
seems determined to go it alone with regards to developing her automotive industry focussing on meeting 
internal demand (Deloitte, 2016). In addition, Ethiopia is not part of the EAC economic bloc although, 
with Kenya and Uganda, is a member of the 19 member COMESA47 trading bloc.  
 
This section looked at the local and regional automotive market. With a significant automotive trade 
deficit across the region, Kenya’s motivation to broaden its fledgling automobile assembly industry can 
be seen to have merit. However, given the lacklustre performance of the sector over the past four decades’ 
re-examination of the fundamental aspects underpinning the sector is necessary. Consolidation amongst 
existing assemblers and further rationalisation of models assembled could be an option worth pursuing 
in order to achieve minimum scale efficiencies. However, this may lead to an oligopolistic situation with 
no guarantee that the resultant ‘transformed’ sector will actually produce affordable and desirable 
vehicles. On the demand side, rising per capita incomes in Kenya and across the East African region may 
signal a gradual rise in demand for motorised transport but this will take time to reach a level sufficient 
to support a fully-fledged auto assembly industry. Lastly, environmental protection measures currently 
being contemplated by governments in the region are likely to impose higher tariffs or complete bans on 
imports of older used vehicles. However, this will also not solve the supply side constraints faced by the 
sector and may actually place the ‘newer’ permissible imports beyond the reach of most consumers. The 
several factors hindering prospects for automobile assembly prompt an examination of the emerging 
motorcycle sub-sector and a discussion of whether growing demand could stimulate faster development 
of Kenya’s automotive capabilities. 
 
                                                 
46 Both Mathieson and Cooksey present reports discussing the political economy surrounding regional integration in the 
EAC noting that historical suspicions among partner states, the perceived threat of Kenya’s economic dominance and 
recurring non-tariff barriers continue to undermine genuine realisation of the Customs Union and Common Market. 




A study of the Kenyan automotive sector and indeed automotive sectors across the developing world 
cannot be complete without an examination of trends within the motorcycles sub-sector.  The motorcycle 
is less complex from a technical standpoint and requires lower capital investments vis-à-vis the 
automobile. It could be argued therefore, that the motorcycle presents countries seeking to develop 
automotive capabilities an easier entry point. A look east towards Asia, which, with the exception of 
Japan, has established automotive manufacturing capabilities fairly, recently provides some telling 
insights. It is estimated that up to 58% of all motorcycles globally are found in the Asia-Pacific, East and 
South Asia regions (TIPS, 2016). The motorcycle industries in China and India have grown to the point 
where they are now major exporters to the developing world with Africa being a major destination 
market. 
 
The value of motorcycles imported into Africa was estimated at USD 1.86 billion in 2015 (TIPS, 2016). 
Interestingly, before 2007 imports were relatively low, at less than USD 500 million annually, but 
increased to over USD 2 billion in 2007. A dip in 2008 due to the global financial crisis (GFC) did not 
last long with imports reverting to the USD 2 billion mark from 2011 onwards. Figure 3.9 illustrates the 
substantial growth in African motorcycle imports over the 15-year period between 2001 – 2015. China 
and India dominate the source markets jointly accounting for 85%, with China estimated to account for 




Figure 3.9: Africa’s motorcycles trade balance (deficit) with the rest of the world 2001–2015 
 
Source: TIPS (2016). Compiled from UN Comtrade statistics (2016) – Trade Map 
 
For the purposes of this discussion the motorcycle sub-sector shall include both two and three-wheeler 
varieties. The reasons cited for the rapid growth of motorcycle usage on the continent are; 
a) Urbanisation 
b) Population growth 
c) Growing traffic congestion in cities 
d) Failure in provision of, and inadequate public transport systems 
e) Rising per capita incomes (especially in the middle and lower income segments) 
 
Due to inefficient public transport systems and poor road infrastructure across most of SSA, the 
motorcycle has risen as a viable alternative with many operated as taxis. Paradoxically, the rise in 
automobile usage due to imports of ‘affordable’ used cars has contributed to growing traffic congestion 
levels. Motorcycle taxis have the ability to navigate past immobile traffic and deliver passengers, as well 
as goods, to destinations faster. 
 
Additionally, much needed employment opportunities are generated by motorcycle taxis. The growing 
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taxies, which it should be highlighted often operate within weak regulatory environments, help alleviate 
the employment challenge by creating opportunities for self-employment and SME expansion for small-
scale fleet operators. 
 
Motorcycle usage in Kenya has been growing especially in urban areas. For the period 2011 – 2015 
registrations of motorcycles surpassed registrations of motor vehicles making up 58% of the total number 
of new registrations. Although growth in motorcycle registrations has remained flat over the period and 
seems to be declining marginally on a per annum basis, it is apparent that motorcycles are now a major 
medium of road transportation. Two-wheeler motorcycles made up the bulk of new motorcycle 
registrations at 97% of the total (table 3.18). 
 
Table 3.18: New Motorcycles Registrations vs Motor vehicles 2011 – 2015 
 
Type of Vehicle 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Totals 
 
Total Motor Vehicles 63 486 77 229 94 017 102 606 107 761 445 099 
Total Motorcycles 142 355 95 815 128 161 115 451 139 420 621 201 
Motor Vehicles + Motorcycles      1,066 300 
Motor Vehicles %      42% 
Motorcycles %      58% 
Motorcycles (Two-wheelers) 140 215 93 970 125 058 111 124 134 645 605 012 
Motorcycles (Three-wheelers) 2 140 1 845 3 103 4 327 4 775 16 190 
Two-wheelers      97% 
Three-wheelers      3% 
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2016) 
 
Kenya is the fourth largest importer of motorcycles on the African continent. Using trade statistics 
published by UN Comtrade, the International Trade Centre (2016) has compiled a list of the top ten 
motorcycle importers in Africa (table 3.19). The bulk of Kenyan motorcycle imports are in the form of 
CKD (completely knocked down) kits that require local assembly48. CKD kits enjoy a lower rate of 
import duty, levied at 15% vis-à-vis 25% for SKD (semi knocked down), kits and FBU (fully built units). 
Asian brands dominate the market as shown in table 3.20. Statistics are hard to come by although the 
recently formed Motorcycle Assemblers Association of Kenya (MAAK) aims to improve the availability 
                                                 
48 This was corroborated during an interview with Car & General (C&G) in February 2017. C&G is a leading assembler and 
distributor of motorcycles in Kenya. Their flagship brand, Piaggio, commands an estimated 65% market share in the three-
wheeler category. Piaggio is an international brand with major operations in Italy and India. 
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of data pertaining to the sub-sector. MAAK was launched in mid-2015 and comprises twenty-one 
assemblers49 employing over five thousand employees (The Star, 6-May-2016). 
 




















Nigeria  446 646  (7) 2.4 9 601  
Egypt  165 602  2  0.9 7 125  
South Africa  123 042  (8) 0.6 10 457  
Kenya  98 428  5  0.5 7 194  
Tanzania  92 542  9  0.5 8 673  
Guinea  75 813  (7) 0.4 11 547  
Ethiopia  71 962  21  0.4 6 185  
Ghana  65 399  (1) 0.3 11 689  
Morocco  63 781  4  0.3 9 109  
Benin  59 500  12  0.3 8 253  
Others   601 669        
Africa  1 864 384   9.8  
Source: International Trade Centre calculations based on UN Comtrade statistics (2016) – Trade Map 
www.trademap.org/index.aspx 
 
Table 3.20: Locally assembled motorcycle brands in Kenya - 2016 
Brand  Estimated Market Share (2016) Country of Origin 
Bajaj 50% India 
TVS 25% India 
Honda 10% Japan 
Yamaha 5% Japan 
Others 10% China 
Source: Authors own estimates based on field interviews conducted with automotive industry stakeholders in February 2017  
The potential the motorcycle sub-sector holds for deeper development of the automotive sector has been 
noticed by both industry stakeholders and the government. Efforts to enhance the level of local inputs in 
                                                 
49 Although described as assemblers in various forums, interviews with stakeholders indicate the majority of these are 
garage workshops that assemble semi-knocked down kits rather than completely knocked down kits, although portray 




motorcycle assembly have commenced with the announcement by the Motorcycle Assemblers 
Association of Kenya (MAAK) of mandatory inclusion of locally manufactured components from June 
2017 (Standard Digital, 10th March 2017). This is an industry-led initiative that has been induced by the 
government’s threat to withdraw the tariff concession applicable on CKD kits. Initially, five out of the 
290 required components will be sourced from local component suppliers. While this is a step in the right 
direction, it constitutes less than 5% of the final assembled unit and indicates how much further local 
content levels will have to rise for a thriving components sector to take shape.  The five components are; 
i) Seat  
ii) Seat frame 
iii) Foot rest 
iv) Stand 
v) Pillion (carrier) 
 
With the exception of the seat, the other four components require basic steel fabrication and welding. 
This could work in favour of component manufacturers with minimal experience and limited capital. 
However, it could also work against efforts to promote domestic capabilities if insufficient restrictions 
are placed on imported substitutes or if such restrictions are not strictly enforced. Time will tell whether 
a domestic industry develops for motorcycle components and if the resultant demonstration effects may 
offer an alternative path for the struggling automobile components industry, notwithstanding the more 






This dissertation examined the prospects and challenges facing late industrialising countries by studying 
the case of the fledgling automotive sector in Kenya, a developing country with a small industrial base. 
The study sought to identify the constraints holding back the four-decade old industry, which seems to 
be in a perpetual state of infancy. Key drivers required to propel the sector forward were identified. These 
drivers can be categorised into four groups; i) factor capabilities i.e. labour skills, capital, and technology; 
ii) industrial and trade policies; iii) value chain integration and iv) access to an ‘automotive space’. The 
literature review highlighted the importance of these drivers in achieving successful outcomes in 
developing countries. To illustrate this, the auto sectors in Mexico and Thailand were discussed as 
examples of what is possible, and necessary, for success. In both instances, an effective mix of industrial 
and trade policies was utilised to support the national industry. This aided the development of domestic 
auto component clusters and facilitated integration into regional and global value chains. Additionally, 
appropriate industrial policies fostered the agility required to adapt the respective national industries’ to 
the global industry’s evolving governance structures. It was also established that availability of a viable 
automotive space is critical. The Mexican auto sector occupies an integrated peripheral market given its 
proximity to the large U.S. market, while the sector in Thailand has thrived due to its lead position in an 
emerging regional market. The insights from reviewing the literature helped focus the lens used to 
examine the sector in Kenya. 
 
Additionally, a high-level analysis of the few existing auto industries was undertaken to help inform the 
discussion on prospects for Kenya. The auto sector is by nature complex and technologically advanced. 
While the continent’s industrial capabilities are by no means homogenous, the broad indicators point to 
very low levels of industrialisation across the continent. Notwithstanding this, there are a few hubs of 
automotive production on the continent notably at the northern and southern-most tips, each of which 
has followed a unique trajectory. The continent’s leading automotive producer, South Africa, developed 
its auto sector under import substitution industrialisation policies but has since adopted a more outward 
stance and achieved a level of success in integrating with global automotive value chains. Longer term, 
the possibility of the South African industry occupying the lead position in a regional or continental 
emerging market is a possibility, but this depends greatly on a significant improvement in the continent’s 
economic prospects. Morocco, Algeria and Egypt in the north face the prospect of being players in an 
integrated peripheral market due to proximity to the large European Union market, as well as 
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participating in a potential emerging regional market in the MENA region. However, at present only the 
sector in Morocco appears likely to make the most of the viable automotive spaces in the region.  
 
The sector in Kenya contrasts sharply with the South African and Moroccan industries. It lacks essential 
attributes which greatly dims its prospects for success. Lack of access to a viable automotive space 
forestalls any demand-led growth, while the absence of domestic component manufacturing renders 
integration into global or regional (continental) value chains a virtual impossibility. The sector’s installed 
capacity for vehicle assembly is small with plant-level performance characterised by significant 
underutilisation. Furthermore, assembly is currently focused on production of light commercial vehicles 
for the small national market. Passenger vehicle assembly is negligible with competition from used 
vehicle imports set to continue in the near to medium term. 
 
The growing popularity of motorcycle use for commuting and commercial purposes has generated 
growing interest in domestic motorcycle assembly. However, this has been supported entirely by the 
importation of assembly kits from China and India with very low levels of locally produced components 
used in assembly. Plans by the industry to increase local content levels are a step in the right direction, 
although this will be starting from a very small base constituting less than 5% of the assembled unit. 
Achieving scale is therefore a long way off and quality and cost considerations could impede faster 
development, especially if imported substitute components circumvent any restrictions that may be 
imposed. 
 
The prognosis for the automotive sector in Kenya does not portray a bright future in the near term. Kenya 
may stand out amidst regional neighbours who have no experience in the sector but this is not a sufficient 
pre-condition. Impending obsolesce of the internal combustion engine may over the long-term lower 
entry barriers to its associated technologies and machinery for late industrialisers. However, this is not 
necessarily an ideal prospect especially from a green economy perspective although it could be an 
improvement on used vehicle imports. The role of economic growth in the east African region cannot be 
overlooked either. Faster increases in per capita incomes would lead to rising demand that could attract 
meaningful investments from global automakers. However, this would require demonstration of a viable 
automotive space in the region underpinned by well-functioning regional integration arrangements.  
 
Lastly, the role of governance structures in the globally oriented auto industry in determining where, 
when and how investments occur is important. National and regional industrialisation strategies must 
66 
 
take cognisance of evolving global trends in formulating appropriate industrial and trade policies. As 
Sturgeon et al. (2009) highlight; governance of global automotive value chains is dominated by a small 
number of very large lead firms with operations spanning the globe. These lead firms now rely mostly 
on large global components suppliers with the resources and capabilities to ‘follow’ the lead firms to new 
international markets, effectively limiting the scope for local component suppliers to develop as well as 
integrate into the value chains governed by the lead firms. National and regional industrialisation 
strategies should formulate policies that not only attract market-seeking FDI but also foster the 
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